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I. PREFACE
Over the last twenty years, a sophisticated legal literature on
treatment decisionmaking and patient competence has emerged.'
Specific analyses of proper criteria of incompetence, and mechanisms
of surrogate decisionmaking, are rooted in rich theoretical discussions
of autonomy, paternalism, and informed consent. This literature has
exposed puzzling questions at the intersection of clinical reality and
moral theory, such as whether the operational meaning of competence
varies, and ought to vary, in relation to the risks and benefits of pro-
posed treatments, and whether different "competence" standards are
and should be applied according to whether patients accept or refuse
recommended treatment.2 Commentators have explored these issues
extensively in relation to psychotropic medication 3 and, more
recently, admission to psychiatric hospitals.4
In contrast to this rich theoretical literature on competence and
treatment decisionmaking, the literature on competence of criminal
defendants has been almost exclusively "applied." The social science
literature is largely descriptive, depicting characteristics of persons
found incompetent, factors associated with findings of incompetence
by clinicians and courts, and the consequences of being found incom-
petent.5 A twenty-year effort to apply scientific techniques to compe-
tence assessment has yielded little.6 Most surprisingly, little research
exists on fundamental empirical issues relating to the meaning of
incompetence. These issues include the functional abilities and disa-
bilities of criminal defendants-with and without mental disorders-
1. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); RUTH FADEN & THOMAS BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986). The word "competence" is out of vogue in the
mental disability field. A variety of factors account for this: The term has a normatively
undesirable global connotation. The implication that incompetence is a personal characteristic
suppresses its situational and interactive aspects. Finally, the term ultimately is a legal
conclusion with inescapably moral dimensions. Notwithstanding all of this, I am using the
term, uncritically, as a shorthand for the functional incapacities of criminal defendants that
trigger the application of various legal rules in a criminal case. In so doing, I am not endorsing
the naive idea that "competence" is an objective, clinically measurable phenomenon. In
referring to the "objective" aspects of judgments about competence, I will use the terms
"abilities" and "capacities" interchangeably.
2. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, 38 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 169
(1991) [hereinafter Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization].
5. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Five-Year Research Update (1986-1990): Evaluations for
Competence to Stand Trial, 10 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 353, 360-62 (1992).
6. Id. at 366.
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as they bear on the tasks required of criminal defendants, and the
needs and expectations of criminal defense attorneys.
7
Although issues relating to the competence of criminal defend-
ants are frequently litigated, most of the case law concerns not the
meaning of "competence" per se, but rather the procedures for raising
and resolving doubts about a defendant's competence. In this con-
text, finality of criminal adjudication constitutes the overriding con-
cern; courts express more concern about the design and
implementation of procedures to ensure that doubts about compe-
tence are raised and resolved at the outset of the litigation-for
"cleansing" the case, as it were-than about the meaning of compe-
tence.8 The only real legal controversy concerns whether the stan-
dard for "competence to plead guilty" is higher than the standard for
"competence to stand trial."9 Yet even in this context, there is very
little discussion about autonomy and client decisionmaking; instead,
attention is directed mainly to practical issues such as the undesirable
impact of a "two-competence" rule on plea bargaining and finality of
adjudication. Frankly, after reviewing the applied forensic literature
and the legal commentary in this area, one has a strong suspicion that
what is most needed is a good theory.
What, then, can be found in the sparse theoretical literature on
competence of criminal defendants? The leading theoretical accounts
tend to focus more on the disutility of the legal rules barring adjudica-
tion than on the meaning of incompetence in relation to the social
purposes that the rules are designed to serve. In 1972, for example,
Robert Burt and Norval Morris called attention to the high costs of
incompetency commitments, both to the defendant and to society,
and argued that the "incompetency plea" should be abolished in favor
of a system of trial continuances.' 0 Under their proposal, cases would
be brought to trial after six months, notwithstanding the defendant's
mental impairment, and special safeguards similar to those used in
cases involving amnesic defendants would be used to ensure the relia-
bility of the adjudication."
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375
(1966).
9. See, e.g., James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 460-66 (1985).
10. Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incompetency
Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66 (1972).
11. Id. at 82, 92-95. Special safeguards in an amnesia case include "that the government's
case must satisfy an extraordinary burden of proof and.., make whatever other adjustments
[that] are necessary to redress the defendant's disadvantages at trial." Id. at 82-83 (footnote
omitted).
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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Despite its contribution to the scholarly literature, the Burt and
Morris approach has found little favor in the courts because their pro-
posal is wholly incompatible with settled law and with "centuries of
common-law theology," as they put it.' 2 Even in 1972, the common-
law bar against convicting incompetent defendants clearly had been
constitutionalized, and the "incompetency plea" could not be abol-
ished altogether. 3 As the Supreme Court subsequently stated in
Drope v. Missouri, the bar against trying the incompetent defendant
"is fundamental to an adversary system of justice."1 4 In the face of
such a deeply rooted doctrine, the abolitionist proposal is, to put it
mildly, somewhat quixotic. 5
More than a decade after Professors Burt and Morris published
their article, Professor Bruce Winick sought to rehabilitate the aboli-
tionist approach without so flagrantly contradicting the pronounce-
ments of the Supreme Court.16 He pointed out that hospitalization
for competence evaluation and commitment upon a finding of incom-
petence often are not in the defendant's best interests (as compared
with disposition of the criminal case). 17 Because the rule prohibiting
conviction of incompetent defendants aims primarily to protect the
defendant's right to a fair adjudication, Professor Winick argues, the
defense should be able to waive the supposed "protections" of the
incompetence doctrine.'"
At this point, Professor Winick's argument confronts a concep-
tual roadblock because waiver by the defendant entails mental compe-
tence to waive, precisely the matter in dispute. Professor Winick
offers two ways to evade this difficulty. One possibility is to prescribe
a minimal standard of competence. Thus, he suggests that mere
expression of a preference for adjudication by the defendant would
12. Id. at 75.
13. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). The Court noted and apparently endorsed
the government's stipulation that "conviction of an accused person [who] is legally
incompetent violates due process." Id. (citation omitted).
The "incompetence plea" bars adjudications adverse to the defendant, not adjudication
per se. Thus, one-way "innocence-only" procedures are permissible. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1368 (West 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 104-11 (Smith-Hurd 1992). For
convenience, however, I will sometimes characterize the rule as one that "bars adjudication."
Despite the awkwardness of the phrase, I will also refer to the defendant's constitutional right
not to be prosecuted or convicted while incompetent.
14. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (citation omitted).
15. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the constitutional bar against prosecuting and
convicting incompetent defendants in Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2581 (1992).
16. Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits,
and a Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1987) [hereinafter Winick,
Incompetency to Stand Trial].
17. Id. at 245-58.
18. Id. at 259-62.
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suffice to effect a valid waiver.1 9 Alternatively, Professor Winick sug-
gests that the attorney, acting as surrogate decisionmaker on behalf of
the incompetent client, should be permitted to waive the "incompe-
tence plea" as long as the client assents.2 °
In developing his argument, Professor Winick expressly invokes
an analogy between decisionmaking in criminal representation and
decisionmaking in therapeutic settings. He recognizes the possibility
that competence to say "yes,"-i.e., to concur with an attorney's rec-
ommendation-may be predicated on a lower standard of competence
(perhaps even akin to simple "assent") than competence to say
"no"-i.e., to decline to follow the attorney's advice.2' As mentioned
above, the idea of differential standards of competence, perhaps on a
sliding scale tilted in a paternalistic direction, has received increasing
theoretical attention in bioethics.22 Professor Winick's article made
an important contribution by linking the literature on competence of
criminal defendants to the literature on treatment decisionmaking. In
the final analysis, however, Professor Winick's argument stumbles on
the same hurdle that tripped Professors Burt and Morris.
The argument's fatal flaw is the assumption that the bar against
adjudication is designed solely to protect the defendant's interests. In
fact, the incompetence doctrine also serves societal interests. First,
the doctrine serves to preserve the criminal process's moral dignity by
prohibiting prosecution and conviction of defendants who lack a
meaningful moral understanding of wrongdoing and punishment or
the nature of criminal prosecution.23 Second, society also has an
independent interest in the reliability of the outcomes in criminal
cases, including an interest in avoiding erroneous convictions.24 This
explains why a defendant's unqualified right to take a case to trial
does not entail a correlative "right" to plead guilty; at a minimum, a
court may decline to accept a guilty plea that lacks an adequate fac-
tual foundation.25
Other constitutional protections that are generally understood to
19. Id. at 269-72.
20. Id. at 278-8 1. Significantly, adjudication would still be barred if an incompetent client
objected to adjudication. Of course, such cases hardly ever arise in practice. Anyone who
would say something such as "I don't want to be tried or convicted" is probably competent.
21. Id. at 269-72.
22. See supra notes 2-4.
23. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
24. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32-43 (2d
ed. 1992). Social scientists would prefer the terms "validity" or "accuracy" to "reliability" in
this context. However, recent constitutional vocabulary typically refers to reliability of the
outcome as a synonym for accuracy.
25. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.ll (1970).
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safeguard the defendant's interests also serve societal interests.
Accordingly, the defendant does not necessarily have the sole option
to waive these interests. For example, society has an independent
interest in the pedagogical features of criminal trials, especially jury
trials. In addition, public access to and participation in criminal pro-
ceedings helps to assure accountability of the judiciary and to effectu-
ate democratic ideals of self-governance. Taken together, these
interests explain why a defendant's unqualified right to insist on a jury
trial does not entail a correlative constitutional right to a bench trial26
and why a defendant's right to a "public trial" does not entail a cor-
relative right to insist on a private trial.27
Thus, the first problem with Professor Winick's analysis is that
the incompetence doctrine does not derive exclusively from a desire to
protect the defendant's right to a fair adjudication. The doctrine also
affects societal interests in the moral dignity and reliability of the
criminal process. A second problem also exists. Even if the incompe-
tence doctrine derived exclusively from a desire to protect the defend-
ant's interests, thereby implying that its protections should be
waivable, neither of Professor Winick's two efforts to formulate a
legally satisfactory theory of waiver fully succeeds.
First, a defendant's ability to express a preference for adjudica-
tion does not sufficiently measure competence to waive a constitu-
tional right (assuming that only the defendant can waive the right).
Expression of a preference either to waive the right to representation
by counsel or to plead guilty rather than have a trial is not enough to
effect a valid waiver of these important constitutional rights. To be
valid, the waiver must be "knowing and intelligent" and the court
must assure, on the record, that these criteria have been satisfied.28
Thus, if the defendant must personally effect the waiver of the right
not to be tried while incompetent, the mere ability to express a prefer-
ence, absent any understanding of the nature of the choice or the con-
sequences of the decision, is not a sufficient substantive test of legal
competence. Knowing that a defendant makes a choice and says
"yes" or "no" would not satisfy even the minimum substantive con-
ception of self-determination.
The idea that expressing a preference effects a waiver might be
reformulated as a procedural proposition, rather than a substantive
one. That is, even though competence to waive requires the ability to
26. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965).
27. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).




understand the nature and consequences of the decision, expression of
a preference might raise a presumption that the defendant is compe-
tent (in a more demanding sense) to make the decision to waive and
has, in fact, made a "knowing and intelligent" waiver. In some con-
texts, evidence that a person has some abilities might raise a presump-
tion that she has other abilities. For example, expressing a preference
may provide a presumptively valid basis for self-admission to a psy-
chiatric hospital or even for waiver of a jury trial by a defendant who
has previously been determined able to understand relevant informa-
tion. In the present context, however, such a presumption would not
be normatively plausible because the underlying issue is whether the
defendant has the abilities needed for self-interested decisionmaking.29
Recognizing the weaknesses of the personal waiver theory, Pro-
fessor Winick offers an alternative theory in which the attorney, as a
surrogate decisionmaker, can effect a valid waiver on behalf of the
defendant, as long as the defendant assents. As I will suggest later,
surrogate decisionmaking by the attorney provides an attractive possi-
bility in some contexts.30 Authorization of it across the board, how-
ever, would nullify fundamental principles of criminal adjudication.
An attorney could not plead guilty on behalf of the defendant, for
example. The question, then, is whether a case for surrogate decision-
making can be made in this context: Should a criminal defense attor-
ney be authorized to decide that it is not in the defendant's best
interests to be subjected to evaluation and commitment on grounds of
possible incompetence, even though the defendant may actually be
incompetent? This question, which has important implications for
the practice of criminal defense, exposes fundamental issues of legal
theory. It therefore provides a useful vehicle for introducing several
questions explored later in this Article.
Professor Winick's suggestion-that when a defense attorney
declines to raise questions about a client's competence, the "incompe-
tence plea" is waived-presents two puzzles. The first is a reliability
problem: the defendant's impairments may prevent disclosure of
29. Although Professor Winick refers to the presumption of competence, he does so in
support of the substantive conclusion that the test of competence should be a low one. Winick,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 16, at 270-72. An alternative argument for a
presumption would rely on a normative preference for non-interference and an empirical
assumption that most people who are able to express a preference are also able to understand
the reasons for the expressed preference. It might even be plausible to argue that the risks
associated with an occasional false positive (a person erroneously presumed to be competent)
are so low that the presumption should be conclusive. In the end, however, the argument must
fail because it effectively forecloses inquiry on the competence of a person to waive legal
safeguards designed to protect incompetent defendants.
30. See infra part III.B.
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important information and may thereby compromise the attorney's
capacity to make informed judgments about defending the case,
including the decision whether a competence inquiry is in the defend-
ant's best interests. The current doctrinal response to this problem
requires attorneys and courts to initiate an inquiry whenever they har-
bor a genuine doubt about the defendant's competence.3a Professor
Winick's proposal leaves this judgment in the hands of counsel. I
tend to agree with Professor Winick 32 but I ground my argument in a
slightly different premise: the attorney is in the best position to decide
whether the defendant's impairments actually impede defense of the
case, i.e., to decide whether the defendant is competent, or at least to
decide whether further inquiry should be undertaken. This is not the
same as saying that the attorney "waives" the defendant's right not to
be convicted while incompetent.
The second theoretical puzzle raised by the attorney-waiver the-
ory relates to disposition of the case. To the extent that disposition of
the case requires decisionmaking by the defendant, the defendant's
incompetence precludes valid decisions. Thus, little will be accom-
plished by allowing the attorney to decline to raise, or to waive, the
incompetence plea unless surrogate decisionmaking by the attorney is
also allowed to effect a valid disposition. ("Innocent-only" adjudica-
tions do not pose problems in this context because the difficulty dis-
cussed above relates exclusively to dispositions adverse to the
defendant.)
Clearly, the attorney has no authorization to enter a guilty plea
as surrogate for an incompetent client. Thus, some mechanism must
be established to assure, at least, validity of a proffered guilty plea,
and doubts about the defendant's mental capacity to understand the
nature and consequences of the plea must be raised and resolved.
However, the attorney-waiver theory may be legally plausible if surro-
gate decisionmaking by the attorney were permitted in tried cases.
Surrogate decisionmaking in tried cases poses an intriguing pos-
sibility. Most trial decisions do not require personal participation by
the defendant, even though many of them have the effect of waiving
constitutional protections. Under prevailing legal and ethical rules,
however, some trial-related decisions do require the defendant's per-
sonal participation. These include whether or not to waive jury trial
and whether or not to testify-decisions required in every case.33
31. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2 (1984).
32. See infra part III.B.
33. See infra part IV.A. The proposition in the text is slightly overstated, of course. Jury
trials are not available in every criminal case. The federal Constitution requires jury trials only
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Should a defendant's decisional incompetence bar adjudication? If
surrogate decisionmaking were permitted, what would be the scope of
the attorney's surrogate authority? Two basic approaches could be
taken. Under a two-way rule, the attorney could decide, on behalf of
the client, all trial decisions, including whether or not to waive jury
trial or whether or not the client should testify. 34 Under a one-way
rule, the attorney's surrogate prerogative would be restricted to deci-
sions that invoke, rather than waive, constitutional rights. 35 Thus, if
the attorney chooses to have a jury trial, this decision would not
require the defendant's competent participation. However, a decision
by the attorney to have a bench trial would require competence of the
client to waive his constitutional right to a jury trial.36 Either of these
approaches leaves room for surrogate decisionmaking by attorneys.
under some circumstances, and accordingly, might leave some room
for a surrogate decision not to raise doubts about the defendant's
incompetence. In short, Professor Winick's waiver theory could have
some residual application in tried cases.
My aim in the preceding pages has been twofold. First, I have
tried to demonstrate that the subject of competence of criminal
defendants is ripe for theoretical development. Second, I have tried to
show that it is possible to develop a theory of competence in the crim-
inal process that takes into account, and builds on, the insights of
if the offense is punishable by more than six months' confinement. Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970).
34. I am referring in the Article to the usual case in which the defendant assents to the
attorney's decision. However, the possibility of two-way surrogate decisionmaking on behalf
of an incompetent client also entails the logical possibility of a decision by the attorney
overriding the client's (incompetent) objection. As a practical matter, such a possibility likely
would arise when the attorney believes that it is in the defendant's best interests to remain
silent although the defendant wants to testify. Whether the attorney's decision should govern
in this situation presents an interesting puzzle. The alternatives are to preclude trial or to
permit the client's "choice" to control, despite the client's incompetence. Although resolution
of this question is peripheral to my primary aims in this Article, I am inclined to say the
client's wishes should control. The underlying normative proposition is that the client who is
able to assist counsel, and can therefore be tried, has a right to testify without regard to
possible decisional incompetence. Cf. Commonwealth v. DeMinico, 557 N.E.2d 744, 745
(Mass. 1990).
35. In the context of whether or not to testify, a one-way rule is not possible because either
choice involves waiver of a constitutional right. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987)
("[t]he opportunity to testify is also a necessary corollary to the . . . guarantee against
compelled testimony.").
36. Even under this one-way view, the law must prescribe a test of competence and must
specify the obligations of defense attorneys and judges in relation to monitoring and resolving
doubts concerning the defendant's competence. For example, the law might permit the
attorney to exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether his doubts about the client's
competence to waive this right should be brought to judicial attention. See infra part III.B.
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Professors Burt, Morris, and Winick, but that remains compatible
with settled traditions of law.
In essence, I argue that "competence" of criminal defendants is
best viewed not as an open-textured single construct, but rather as
two related but separable constructs 37 -a foundational concept of
competence to assist counsel, and a contextualized concept of deci-
sional competence. Competence to assist counsel, as I define it,
encompasses the criteria articulated in Dusky v. United States 3s and
Drope v. Missouri,39 which typically are said to denote "competence to
stand trial." Decisional competence refers to the additional abilities
required for legally valid decisionmaking. In the most controversial
part of my argument, I suggest that the "tests" of decisional compe-
tence should and, in practice, do vary according to context.'
Part II presents an overview of my argument. In Part III I focus
on competence to assist counsel. Unlike Professors Burt, Morris, and
Winick, I accept and endorse the bar against adjudication if the
defendant lacks the abilities necessary to assist counsel; that is, I
accept Dusky and Drope. However, like Professors Burt, Morris, and
Winick, I believe that formal judicial intervention under the compe-
tence doctrine should be minimized and that correspondingly greater
attention should be paid to the responsibilities and prerogatives of
defense counsel.
The greatest need for theoretical development arises in relation
to decisional competence. By extracting decisional competence from
the unitary concept of "competence" in criminal adjudication, I hope
to stimulate courts and commentators to reach beyond Dusky and
Drope. Building on Professor Winick's insights, I aim to explore and
develop the analogy between decisionmaking in the attorney-client
relationship and in the doctor-patient relationship. In addition, I
want to encourage a closer link between the law governing compe-
tence of criminal defendants and the rapidly developing law governing
decisionmaking by criminal defendants.41
37. See infra parts II-IV.
38. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). "[T]he 'test will be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'"
Id.
39. 420 U.S. 162 (1975). "It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition
is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
subjected to a trial." Id. at 171.
40. See infra part W.B.
41. For example, in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), the Court declared a
constitutional right to testify, which has provoked an unresolved controversy regarding the
[Vol. 47:539
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In Part IV, I explore the concept of decisional competence and
apply the theory in several specific decisionmaking contexts. The aim
is to further develop my claim that tests for decisional competence
should vary according to the context and to illustrate the possibilities
for surrogate decisionmaking. In Part V, I comment on the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Moran v. Godinez4 2 which draws a distinction
similar to the one drawn in this Article between competence to assist
counsel and decisional competence. Having granted certiorari in
Moran, the Supreme Court has an opportunity to take the law beyond
Dusky and Drope. Part VI concludes with a discussion of a recent
decision by the Tenth Circuit which illustrates continued judicial
uncertainty about the meaning of the Dusky formula in relation to
decisional competence.
II. A THEORY OF COMPETENCE IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE
What does it mean to be "competent" to participate in one's own
defense? Forensic clinicians say that the meaning of competence is
highly contextualized and that the standard, however formulated, is
an "open-textured" one.43 Whether a defendant is "competent"
depends on the seriousness and complexity of the charges, on what is
expected of the defendant in the given case, on the client's relation-
ship with the attorney, on counsel's skill, and other "interactive" fac-
tors." The instruments available for structuring forensic interviewing
and decisionmaking in this context typically list the many potentially
relevant abilities, even though they may not have particular signifi-
cance in a given case. These instruments do not prescribe definitive
"scoring" criteria, but rely instead upon a clinical judgment based on
all the circumstances of the given case.4 5
The current practice of competence assessment and adjudication
lacks normative texture and, as a result, is highly discretionary.
Appellate courts rarely review and almost never reverse trial court
decisions that find defendants incompetent, or decline to do so. In a
respective roles of attorney and client and the need for a contemporaneous judicial
determination that a non-testifying defendant has made a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of
the right to testify. For discussion of this controversy, see, e.g., United States v. Teague, 953
F.2d 1525, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), and cases cited therein.
42. 972 F.2d 263 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub noma. Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 810
(1992).
43. See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 10-
13 (1980); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.1 commentary at
175 (1986) ("A determination of competence or incompetence is functional in nature, context-
dependent and pragmatic in orientation.").
44. See THOMAS GRIsso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 76-77 (1986).
45. Id. at 78-104 (reviewing and discussing the most widely-used instruments).
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sequential decisionmaking process, discretion tends to slide back-
wards. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that trial judges
almost always defer to clinical opinion in pretrial competence deter-
minations.46 Thus, forensic clinicians rather than judges effectively
exercise discretion to define competence, which is a source of continu-
ing dissatisfaction to commentators, if not to forensic clinicians and
judges.
Conceptualizing competence as an open-textured construct
obscures the critically important distinction between the clinical/
descriptive and legal/evaluative dimensions of competence assess-
ment. Adjudication of "competence to stand trial" lacks the norma-
tive texture needed to help separate the role of the expert and the role
of the judge. Notwithstanding the trend away from "ultimate issue"
testimony by mental health professionals in other contexts, forensic
clinicians commonly discover that judges practically insist on ulti-
mate issue opinion in reports and testimony on competence to stand
trial.47
Perhaps this highly subjective, discretionary approach to compe-
tence assessment and adjudication is preferable to any of the available
alternatives. It is certainly preferable to a regime in which the defend-
ant's mental and physical disabilities have no legal significance.
Moreover, an open-textured inquiry is sometimes superior, notwith-
standing its discretionary features, to more structured normative cri-
teria. Typically, this superiority stems from the fact that any effort to
limit the factors that may be considered will be underinclusive and
any effort to order the factors or to prescribe structured decision rules
will not fit all cases. For example, the persistence of "best interests of
the child" as the standard for child custody determinations reflects a
settled preference for the highly individualized approach. Though the
pendulum in criminal sentencing has recently swung in the direction
of more determinate normative criteria, the Constitution requires
46. See Stephen L. Golding et al., Assessment and Conceptualization of Competency to
Stand Trial. Preliminary Data on the Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview, 8 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 321 (1984); Stephen D. Hart & Robert D. Hare, Predicting Fitness to Stand Trial: The
Relative Power of Demographic, Criminal and Clinical Variables, 5 FORENSIC REPORTS 53, 56,
59 (1992) (in a study of males remanded for competency to stand trial the courts agreed with
77 out of 80 clinician recommendations); James H. Reich & Linda Tookey, Disagreements
Between Court and Psychiatrist on Competency to Stand Trial, 47 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
29-30 (1986).
47. See, e.g., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-3.9 and
accompanying commentary at 118-30 (1986) (specifically permitting ultimate issue testimony




individualized decisionmaking in capital sentencing adjudication."
In my opinion the open-textured approach to competence assess-
ment in criminal adjudication is inferior to the more structured
approach outlined in this Article. It is possible, in this setting, to for-
mulate criteria which facilitate objective decisionmaking and mean-
ingful judicial supervision while producing normatively attractive
outcomes. The proposed approach has several additional advantages.
First, it is compatible with the intuitive understanding of clinicians
and judges regarding the meaning of competence and with the settled
features of existing law. Second, it helps to clarify the issues in areas
where the law remains unsettled or controversial, such as the circum-
stances under which incompetence bars adjudication and whether the
"test" for competence to plead guilty differs from the test for compe-
tence-to-stand trial. Third, because this approach derives from a the-
oretical analysis of the purposes served by the pertinent legal rules, it
provides a framework for defining the "psycho-legal abilities" that are
relevant to competence determinations and thereby facilitates
research designed to improve the scientific basis of competence assess-
ments in criminal cases.
A. Premises
A review of cases and commentary yields three conceptually
independent rationales for barring adjudication on grounds of a
defendant's incompetence. I will label them dignity, reliability, and
autonomy.
A person who lacks a rudimentary understanding of the nature
and purpose of the proceedings against her is a not a "fit" subject for
criminal prosecution and punishment. To proceed against such a per-
son offends the moral dignity of the process because it treats the
defendant not as an accountable person, but as an object of the state's
effort to carry out its promises. Only cases involving defendants who
lack a meaningful moral understanding of wrongdoing and punish-
ment or the nature of a criminal prosecution implicate the dignity
rationale.49
48. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
49. Lists of purposes served by the incompetence doctrine typically include the need to
preserve the decorum of the courtroom and the dignity of the trial process. See, e.g., Note,
Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1967). However, I do not regard this as
a viable rationale for a bar against adjudication. If necessary, a disruptive defendant can be
removed from the courtroom and an otherwise competent defendant can waive her right to be
present. Moreover, judges should be very tolerant of "disturbing" behavior in the courtroom
during plea proceedings and bench trials. In short, the "dignity" rationale for the
incompetence doctrine refers to the inherent morality of the process carried out in the
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Beyond the minimal demands of the dignity rationale, the bar
against adverse adjudication in cases involving incompetent defend-
ants serves as a prophylactic protection against erroneous convictions.
Just as the assistance of competent counsel is regarded as a prerequi-
site of reliable adjudication, so too is the participation of a competent
defendant. As stated by Henry Weihofen in 1954, a mentally
impaired defendant might be unfairly convicted if he "alone has
knowledge" of certain facts but does "not appreciate the value of such
facts, or the propriety of communicating them to his counsel. ' 50 To
proceed against a defendant who lacks the capacity to recognize and
communicate relevant information to his attorney and to the court
would be unfair to the defendant and would undermine society's
independent interest in the reliability of its criminal process. This
provides the basis for the Supreme Court's belief that the bar against
trying the incompetent defendant "is fundamental to an adversary
system of justice."51
As critics of the existing legal arrangements have correctly noted,
the bar against prosecuting incompetent defendants evolved at a time
when the defendant bore responsibility for mounting her own
defense. 52 Indeed, assistance of counsel was actually precluded in fel-
ony and treason cases until the mid-eighteenth century. 3 Today, in
contrast, assistance of counsel is available as a matter of constitutional
right in all serious criminal cases. 54 Although representation by coun-
sel does not render the traditional rules obsolete, the construct of
incompetence itself must be operationalized in the context of the
attorney-client relationship. Thus, to the extent that the meaning of
incompetence derives from its instrumental function, it refers to the
courtroom, not to its outward appearances. I discuss these issues in Richard J. Bonnie, The
Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291,
315-16 (1992) [hereinafter Bonnie, Theoretical Reformulation].
50. HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 429-30 (1954); see
also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 24:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and, before
arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it, because
he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if,
after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can
he make his defense? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses
before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he
becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed ....
51. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). Social scientists should note that courts
use reliability in constitutional adjudication as a synonym for "validity" or accuracy of
outcome. See supra note 24.
52. See Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 16, at 260.
53. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1975).




capacity to provide whatever assistance counsel requires in order to
explore and present an adequate defense."
A third feature of the competence construct, which is concep-
tually independent of the two aspects thus far mentioned, derives
from legal rules that establish that the defendant must make or have
the prerogative to make certain decisions regarding the defense or dis-
position of the case. A construct of "decisional competence" is an
inherent, though derivative, feature of any legal doctrine that
prescribes a norm of client autonomy. In theory, one could imagine a
system of criminal adjudication that leaves no room for client self-
determination--one which bars self-representation, does not permit
guilty pleas, and commits all decisions regarding defense of the case to
counsel rather than the defendant.56 Under these legal arrangements,
a defendant's decisional competence would not be relevant. But this
does not describe our system.
In our system, the law commits some decisions regarding the
defense or disposition of the case to the defendant and not to the
attorney. According to all authorities, these include decisions regard-
ing the plea, and, if the case is to be tried, whether it should be tried
before a jury, whether the defendant will be present, and whether the
defendant will testify.5 7 In more general terms, the defendant is per-
mitted, if not required, to make decisions regarding the objectives of
representation, including the basic theory of defense.58 For some of
55. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 ("It has long been accepted that a person whose
mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may
not be subjected to a trial."); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) ("[T]he 'test
must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.' " (quoting the Solicitor General)).
56. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 holding that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to waive
assistance of counsel and to represent himself, makes such a system constitutionally
implausible, but it is noteworthy that three Justices dissented.
57. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52-53 (1987) (whether to testify); Brookhart
v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (whether to plead guilty); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (waiver of jury trial). See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2(a) (1986); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.2(a) (1983).
58. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2(a) (1986); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983). In contrast, "decisions on what witnesses to
call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial
motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive
province of the lawyer after consultation with the client." ABA STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 4-5.2(b) (1986); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 746 (1983)
(regarding lawyer's prerogative to decide what issues to raise on appeal). The distinction
between "objectives" and "means" of representation is, of course, indeterminate at the
margins.
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
these decisions (i.e. those involving waivers of constitutional rights),
the obligation imposed on courts to assure that the defendant's deci-
sion is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made reinforces the
principle of self-determination. 59 Not surprisingly, judicial scrutiny is
likely to be most intensive when the defendant decides to represent
himself.6°
B. The Conceptual Vocabulary
Against this theoretical backdrop, I want to propose a simple
and relatively uncontroversial conceptual vocabulary that reflects a
sensible understanding of the main purposes served by competence
determinations in the criminal process. The vocabulary itself is meant
to be normatively neutral.6 ' It carries no implications regarding the
psychological abilities that a legal "test" of competence should
encompass and, specifically, regarding the "level" of competence that
should be required in any specific context.
I want to draw a key conceptual distinction between a founda-
tional concept of "competence to assist counsel" and a contextualized
concept of "decisional competence." (See Table 1). "Competence to
assist counsel," refers to the minimum conditions required for partici-
pating in one's own defense. Taking their guidance from Dusky and
Drope, most courts and commentators refer to: (1) capacity to under-
stand the charges, the purpose of the criminal process, and the adver-
sary system, especially the role of defense counsel; 62 (2) capacity to
appreciate one's situation as a defendant in a criminal prosecution;
63
and (3) ability to recognize and relate pertinent information to coun-
sel concerning the facts of the case. 64 As I define the concept here,
59. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464-65 (1938).
60. Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966).
61. The vocabulary obviously is not normatively neutral to the extent that it assumes that
(in)competence matters in the ways described in the previous section.
62. This refers to the "factual understanding" component of Dusky. Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
63. This refers to the "rational understanding" component of Dusky. Id.
64. This phrase elaborates on the cognitive process needed to "consult with" and "assist"
counsel mentioned in Dusky and Drope. In addition, the "ability to assist counsel" may also
encompass an affective or "motivational" component pertaining to capacity to cooperate with
the attorney, thereby enabling the attorney to perform her assigned role in the process. Cf.
State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Wis. 1986) (finding reason to doubt defendants
competency based, in part, on psychologist's letter to defense counsel indicating his "belief that
[the defendant's] thinking impinges on his ability to rationally aid in the preparation of his
defense").
A separate motivational component is not necessary to encompass delusional beliefs
pertaining to the role of counsel because they are included within the concept of appreciation.




Two Realms of Competence in Criminal Defense: Conceptual Summary
Competence to Assist Counsel
" Foundational requirement
" Incompetence precludes adjudication
" Serves interests in dignity of criminal process and reliability of
adjudication
* Does not encompass decisionmaking abilities
Decisional Competence
* Independently significant if and only if defendant is competent to
assist counsel
* Required only when decision must be made by defendant
* Promotes interest in autonomous decisionmaking by defendant
* Abilities required, and legal test, vary according to decisionmaking
context
* Incompetence does not preclude adjudication
however, it does not encompass the ability to make decisions that may
arise in the case or the defendant's likely behavioral functioning at
trial.
As customarily defined, these components serve both the dignity
and reliability rationales described above. The capacities required to
assure the dignity of the process would seem to include the ability to
understand the nature of wrongdoing and punishment, the purpose
and effect of a criminal prosecution and conviction, and the ability to
relate this understanding to one's own situation as a defendant. The
capacities required to assure the reliability of the outcome would seem
to include the ability to understand the role of the defense attorney
and to apply that understanding to one's own situation, and the abil-
ity to recognize and relate pertinent information in a coherent
manner.
The capacities required to preserve the dignity of the process and
to assure reliability are conceptually distinct. Although they probably
overlap a great deal empirically, abundant clinical experience demon-
strates that they are not congruent, and that the ability to perform
one set of tasks does not necessarily predict ability to perform the
other. Some mentally disabled defendants who understand the pro-
cess and their own situations are unable to assist counsel; and, con-
motivation to cooperate present difficulties in distinguishing between "can't" and "won't."
The possibility that failure to cooperate or assist could be construed as "inability" to cooperate
or assist raises serious moral hazard problems. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Logan, 549 A.2d
531, 539 (Pa. 1988). These issues, whether competence to assist counsel should include a
motivational component and, if so, how it should be operationalized, need more systematic
attention than they have thus far received.
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versely, a delusional defendant may be able to understand counsel's
role and to relate relevant information but may believe that the crimi-
nal prosecution serves a benevolent divine plan and has no punitive
purpose or effect. Despite the conceptual and empirical divergence of
these two groups of capacities, however, it is sensible to combine them
in a single foundational construct because both of these rationales,
dignity and reliability, underlie the traditional bar against prosecution
and conviction of incompetent defendants.65
In most cases, questions about "competence to assist counsel"
arise at the outset of the process, before significant interactions with
counsel have occurred and before strategic decisions regarding
defense of the case have been encountered or considered. This has
two implications: First, for defendants regarded initially as incompe-
tent, restorative intervention achieves sufficient improvement to per-
mit the procedural bar to be lifted in most cases. Second,
determinations of competence in borderline cases, either upon initial
assessment or upon restoration, are best regarded as provisional.
A defendant who is provisionally competent to assist counsel
may not be competent to make specific decisions 66 that are encoun-
tered as the process unfolds.6 7 Decisionmaking involves cognitive
tasks in addition to those required for assisting in one's defense, as
defined above, including abilities to understand and choose among
alternative courses of action. Which abilities should be regarded as
necessary for legally valid decisionmaking, and therefore included
within a "test" of decisional competence, must derive from a norma-
65. Although both rationales underlie the traditional bar against prosecution, the
reliability and dignity rationales can be disentwined. For example, it is possible to imagine a
system in which prosecution could proceed against a defendant who is unable to assist counsel
if reliable adjudication could otherwise be assured. Burt & Morris, supra note 10, at 93-95. If
the law permitted prosecutions in such cases, then the foundational dimension of competence
would include only those capacities necessary to assure the dignity of the process.
It should also be noted that the dignity rationale does have independent and exclusive
force in relation to the variety of companion common-law doctrines (carried forward in many
contemporary statutes) that barred the sentencing of a defendant who became incompetent
after conviction and that barred the execution of sentence against a prisoner who became
incompetent after pronouncement of judgment. In fact, the ban on executing the "presently
incompetent," now constitutionalized in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), can only be
understood in dignitarian terms. See Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death
Penalty: Conscientious Abstention, Professional Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 86-88 (1990).
66. As noted earlier, relevant "decisions" are those that the law commits to the competent
defendant and not to the lawyer.
67. The question also arises whether a defendant who is unable to assist counsel, as defined
here, may nonetheless be decisionally competent. Although the question is solely of
theoretical interest because inability to assist counsel bars adjudication, the relation between
abilities required for assisting counsel and for decisionmaking should be explored empirically.
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tive conception of client autonomy in criminal defense. For the
moment, however, the focus is not on the precise content of the
"test," but rather on whether decisionmaking capacity, however
defined, is best understood as a component of a single construct of
competence in the criminal process or rather as a separate construct.
Competence in the criminal process might be sensibly under-
stood as a single construct if a generally applicable test of decision-
making ability could be defined and folded into a unitary test of
adjudicative competence. This approach would promote efficiency in
assessment because it would not require contextualized application
and would resolve all potential disputes about competence at one
time. Despite these practical advantages, however, the "single con-
struct" approach has two serious normative disadvantages. First, it is
fundamentally incompatible with the contemporary understanding of
the contextual nature of legal incompetence. It is now axiomatic that
a person may be competent for one purpose, such as decisionmaking
about medical treatment, but not about others, such as the manage-
ment of financial affairs. Tests of competence, and the procedures
required to resolve doubts about competence, vary from context to
context, depending upon both normative and practical considerations.
Adherence to the idea that a criminal defendant is competent for all
decisionmaking purposes, or for none, would be anomalous in the face
of such a pervasive understanding.
A second problem with the single construct approach is that it
unnecessarily links the finding of decisional incompetence to the pro-
cedural bar against adjudication. Prosecution of a defendant who is
not competent to assist counsel, as defined above, should be categori-
cally barred to preserve the moral dignity of the criminal process and
to avoid an unacceptable risk of unreliable convictions. However,
more flexible responses, such as surrogate decisionmaking or specifi-
cally tailored default rules, should be available to deal with deficien-
cies in decisional competence. The bar against adjudication is, in
effect, a categorical default rule that, in most situations, does not serve
the interest of either the defendant or society. In no other legal con-
text does a finding of decisional incompetence have such paralyzing
consequences.
In the context of waiver of counsel and choosing to represent
oneself, decisional competence is by all accounts a separate con-
struct.6" A defendant who is competent to proceed to adjudication
68. The focus here is only on the decisionmaking abilities required for effecting a legally
valid waiver of one's right to be represented by counsel in favor of self-representation, i.e., to
exercise one's "Faretta right." I am not referring to whatever performance abilities may be
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with counsel may not be allowed to proceed to adjudication without
representation. In Faretta v. California,69 the Supreme Court explic-
itly recognized the constitutional right to self-representation, but also
acknowledged that the right increases the danger of unreliable adjudi-
cation.70 Faretta holds, in effect, that autonomy can trump reliabil-
ity.71 However, in the wake of Faretta, courts have uniformly
concluded that autonomy prevails only if the defendant satisfies a
more demanding test of decisional competence than would otherwise
be required for adjudication with counsel.72
Faretta and its progeny reflect an explicit trade-off between
autonomy and reliability in cases involving defendants who want to
represent themselves. These considerations, however, may also con-
flict in cases involving defendants who are represented by counsel.
Thus, we should expect the test for decisional competence to be espe-
cially demanding in situations where reliability is seriously
threatened, such as when a defendant wants to plead guilty against his
lawyer's advice,7 a or rejects the most plausible theory of defense in
favor of a theory that the attorney believes to be unsupportable.
Moreover, autonomy is more at stake in some decisional contexts
than in others. Decisions whether or not to raise an insanity defense,
or whether or not to seek leniency in a capital prosecution, inevitably
implicate the personal values of the defendant. Other decisions, such
required, in addition to decisional competence, for self-representation at a trial. Nor does this
discussion have any bearing on the abilities required to waive one's right to counsel during a
custodial interrogation.
69. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
70. Id. at 834. "It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could
better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts." Id.
71. Id. "[T]he defendant ... must be free personally to decide whether in his particular
case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is
the lifeblood of the law.'" Id. (citation omitted).
72. See, e.g., State v. Harding, 670 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1983); People v. Burnett, 188 Cal. App.
3d 1314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87 (Colo. 1989); State v. Bauer,
245 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1976). These rulings had been presaged by Westbrook v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 150 (1966). At a minimum, the defendant must have the capacity to understand and
weigh the risks and benefits of self-representation, including the risk that the defendant might
be erroneously convicted due to deficiencies of his self-representation. This situation does not
entirely sacrifice society's independent interest, because a valid Faretta waiver may require the
"mental ability to present a rudimentary defense" or "some minimal ability to present a
personal defense." See Burnett, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 1318-29.
73. Concerns about reliability may be so compelling that the defendant is denied the
prerogative to decide to plead guilty, even if he is competent. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1018 (West 1992) (precluding a defendant from pleading guilty to a capital offense without
the consent of his lawyer). However, the same concerns that underlie the California statute
might yield an alternative rule that respects the defendant's prerogative to reject counsel's
advice, but only if the defendant meets a demanding test of competence.
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as whether to waive indictment or preliminary hearing, are primarily
matters of "legal judgment" and therefore so unlikely to implicate the
defendant's personal values that the attorney may be allowed to make
them without the defendant's participation at all. Furthermore, even
if client participation is required, it may be required only if the deci-
sion goes in one direction (i.e., to waive the right), in which case one
would not expect an especially demanding test for competence.
Even when autonomy is clearly at stake, paternalistic concerns
appear more prominently in some decisional contexts, requiring attor-
neys and courts to take extra steps to resolve doubts about compe-
tence. For example, the attorney may be obligated to raise in court
whatever genuine doubts she has about a client who instructs her not
to present a case in mitigation at a capital sentencing proceeding.74
However, this same attorney may not be obligated to raise these con-
cerns about a defendant who has assented to her recommendation
that a jury trial be waived in favor of a bench trial.75
In short, decisions that defendants are expected or permitted to
make in the course of a criminal defense are normatively diverse. As
Faretta demonstrates, a single criterion of decisional competence is
not likely to fit every decisional context. Practical reasons may exist
for deploying a single test of decisional competence, but any such cri-
terion will inevitably produce undesirable results, either by respecting
client prerogatives in cases where doing so endangers reliability, or by
barring adjudication in cases in which the mentally impaired defend-
ant is not called upon to waive any constitutional rights or to make
any other significant decisions.
In summary, rules relating to a defendant's decisional compe-
tence derive from the rules allocating decisionmaking prerogatives in
criminal defense. Client autonomy may be displaced entirely in some
contexts, in which case competence does not come into play at all.
When the law permits or requires client participation, however, com-
petence is a prerequisite to validity. My sole claim at this point is that
the normative diversity of decisional contexts in criminal defense
strongly implies that the criteria for decisional competence, and the
procedures required for raising and resolving doubts, likely will vary
from one context to another.
The criteria for decisional competence, the procedures for resolv-
74. See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 739 P.2d 523, 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Commonwealth
v. Crawley, 526 A.2d 334, 340 n.1 (Pa. 1987); see also Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the
Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1388-89 (1988) [hereinafter Bonnie, The Dignity of the
Condemned].
75. Cf. McCarlo v. State, 677 P.2d 1268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
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ing doubts about competence, and the legal responses to incompe-
tence can be sensibly formulated only in the context of a more general
theory concerning client autonomy in the attorney-client relationship.
Insofar as the theory aims to describe the existing legal rules, it must
explain why certain decisions are allocated to the competent defend-
ant rather than to counsel,76 and why counsel generally has no legally
enforceable obligation, analogous to the physician's duty in medicine,
to facilitate informed client decisionmaking. 7 Recognizing that legal
rules cannot assure autonomous action, even for competent persons,
what function do they actually serve?78 Development of such a the-
ory would exceed the ambition of this Article. However, I will ven-
ture some tentative assertions in support of a "weak" theory of client
self-determination: Attorneys have an obligation to inform clients of
their prerogative to make binding decisions regarding defense and dis-
position of the case. However, clients need not personally make such
decisions in any authentic sense and the attorney's obligation to pro-
vide information pertinent to a given decision is generally contingent
upon the client's desire to be informed. In my view, only in the con-
text of such a theory can one make sense of the law governing deci-
sional (in)competence in the criminal process.
The next two sections will elaborate on the theoretical implica-
tions of the distinction between competence to assist counsel and deci-
sional competence. These two concepts, as defined above, seem to
embrace the full range of competencies in the criminal process. I am
presently inclined to regard competence to plead guilty and compe-
tence to stand trial as particular elaborations of these foundational
concepts. However, as I will discuss below, these are provisional
opinions which may be modified in light of empirical investigation
and further theoretical discourse.
76. For example, should the attorney be permitted, or even obligated, to introduce
mitigating evidence in a capital case over the defendant's objection? See Bonnie, The Dignity
of the Condemned, supra note 74. Should the attorney be permitted to seek a lesser included
offense instruction over the defendant's objection? Cf. State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176 (Wis.
1986).
77. In response to a perceived pattern of attorney dominance in the attorney-client
relationship, several commentators have proposed that the informed consent doctrine be
implanted in the law of attorney-client relations. See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn, Informed
Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering
and Client Decision Making. Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
41 (1979); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987). To date, however, facilitation of
informed client decisionmaking remains an aspirational ethical norm rather than a legal duty.
78. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 274-97.
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III. COMPETENCE TO ASSIST COUNSEL AND
THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY
One of the most important advantages of separating decisional
competence from the foundational construct of competence to assist
counsel is that it permits tailored responses to cases involving deci-
sional incompetence that are not possible when abilities relating to
decisionmaking are folded into a single construct of adjudicative com-
petence. Discrete tests of decisional competence can be defined to fit
particular decisionmaking contexts. Most importantly, a finding of
decisional incompetence need not bar adjudication. Only incompe-
tence to assist counsel bars adjudication. It follows, however, that the
components of competence to assist counsel must be defined and
applied with its preclusive effect in mind.
A. A Two-Step Approach
Does the application of "competence to assist counsel" depend
on the particular defendant's factual situation? This issue has both
practical and theoretical dimensions. On the one hand, viewing com-
petence to assist counsel in absolute terms has many practical advan-
tages. Most importantly, definitive assessments could be made early
in the process against a single normatively-derived standard and need
not be focused on the circumstances of the particular defendant's case
(which are not likely to be evident to the evaluator in any event).
Moreover, in theoretical terms, the capacities required to preserve the
moral dignity of the criminal process can be formulated and assessed
without reference to the facts of a particular defendant's case.
On the other hand, an absolute standard will either be underin-
clusive or overinclusive in terms of the ultimate concern with reliabil-
ity of the outcome. If the threshold of competence to assist counsel is
set too low, deficient interactions between attorney and client could
lead to erroneous convictions. If the threshold is set too high in order
to account for the demands presented by the most intricate case, some
defendants will unnecessarily be found incompetent and hospitalized.
As a result, some reliable convictions will unnecessarily be barred.
Thus, reliability concerns suggest that "competence to assist counsel"
must be sufficiently linked to the particular defendant's situation to
take into account the complexity of the charges and the attorney's
actual need for information.79
79. This is the common understanding reflected in the forensic literature on assessment of
competence in criminal defendants. See, e.g., GRISSO, supra note 44, at 76-77. In Grisso's
terminology, assessment of competence to assist counsel has "interactive" dimensions. Id. at
23-26.
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Table 2
Components of Competence to Assist Counsel
1. Understanding the nature and purpose of criminal prosecution and
punishment and the nature of the adversary process, especially the role of
defense counsel.
2. Capacity to understand the criminal charge(s).
3. Appreciation of one's own situation as a defendant in a criminal
prosecution.
4. Capacity to recognize and relate pertinent information to counsel
concerning the facts of the case.
An analogous problem is raised when a defendant has amnesia at
the time of the offense. Under the prevailing judicial practice, courts
determine the legal significance of a genuine claim of amnesia in light
of the strength of the evidence in the particular case; they bar adjudi-
cation only if a significant possibility exists that the defendant would
have been able to produce evidence raising a reasonable doubt about
guilt.80 The court makes a reliability judgment on a case-by-case
basis.
Professors Burt and Morris, who propose abolition of the
"incompetence plea," argue that the more flexible amnesia rule
should displace the currently prevailing per se rule." Adjudication
should be permitted, they argue, as long as the procedures are
designed suitably to redress the disadvantages attributable to the
defendant's mental disability. In my view, the analogy between amne-
sia and other mental disabilities would be apt if reliability were the
only relevant consideration. However, the Burt and Morris proposal
fails to account for the widely-shared intuition that adjudication of
guilt is morally inappropriate unless the defendant has a basic under-
standing of the prosecutorial process. The moral dignity of the crimi-
nal process requires, as a minimum, a categorical bar on adjudication
in some cases. If this is acknowledged, much is gained by including
within the foundational test of competence certain minimum capaci-
ties for assisting counsel in addition to those required to preserve the
dignity of the process.
From a normative standpoint, a two-step approach would seem
to provide a sensible resolution. An "absolute" level of capacity to
assist counsel should be required in all cases. The components of the
test probably should include an actual understanding of the nature
and purpose of the criminal process, appreciation of one's own situa-
80. E.g., Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
81. Burt & Morris, supra note 10, at 82-83.
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tion as a criminal defendant, and a capacity to recognize and relate
relevant information to the attorney. 2 However, adjudication should
be barred, even for defendants who meet these minimum require-
ments, if their disabilities, in relation to understanding the charges or
communicating with counsel, raise serious doubts about the reliability
of the process in the particular case.
I suspect that prevailing clinical and judicial practice conforms
to this two-step model. By law, courts and attorneys currently must
refer defendants for evaluation whenever a bona fide doubt about
mental capacity, regardless of context, is raised.83 The threshold for
referral is set very low in order to cleanse all cases of doubts about
competence. The evaluators find most defendants competent and
most other defendants are restored to competence after a short period
of treatment. However, even after a reasonable period of treatment a
small proportion of defendants do not become clearly competent. In
these borderline cases, I suspect that, in practice, defendants are
returned to court as "competent" after meeting a fairly low standard.
The case then proceeds unless the attorney raises further doubts, indi-
cating a genuine concern about the adequacy of the defendant's assist-
ance in the particular case.
This observation implies that the attorney is best situated to
know whether the defendant's impairments compromise the defense
of the case. In some situations, this might lead an attorney to ques-
tion the competence of a client who has been (provisionally) "found"
competent in a previous evaluation earlier in the case. In other situa-
tions, however, an attorney might see no reason to question the "com-
petence" of an impaired client because, in the attorney's judgment,
the defendant's impairments do not affect his ability to develop a
defense.
82. A definition of competence to assist counsel often includes understanding the charge,
and forensic specialists typically emphasize that this is one of the interactive aspects of
competence assessment. That is, a defendant who is able to understand some charges may not
be able to understand more complex charges. My tentative view, however, is that ability to
understand the charges in one's own case is not an independent prerequisite for competence to
assist counsel. Such competence only requires the ability to relate pertinent information to the
attorney. A defendant's inability to understand the subtleties of the charge may become
pertinent later on in the process if the defendant seeks to plead guilty because the incapacity
may affect the reliability of the admissions embedded in the plea. Richard J. Bonnie, The
Competence of Criminal Defendants With Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own
Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 435-42 (1990) [hereinafter Bonnie, The
Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental Retardation]; Bonnie, Theoretical
Reformulation, supra note 49, at 311-12.
83. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL: HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2(c) and
accompanying commentary at 179-81 (1986).
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B. The Role of the Defense Attorney
As previously noted, one of the most interesting and controver-
sial issues about competence to assist counsel concerns the circum-
stances under which the attorney must raise the issue and seek a
competency evaluation. 4 The prevailing view obligates the attorney
to raise the issue formally whenever she has a "good faith doubt"
about the client's competence, notwithstanding the belief that such a
course is not in the client's best interests. Imposing this obligation on
the attorney, as well as on the prosecution and the trial court, is gen-
erally thought to be a necessary corollary of the procedural bar
against adjudication of incompetent defendants.8 5
I disagree. Even though the Due Process Clause bars disposition
of cases against defendants who are unable to assist counsel, it does
not follow that the issue must be raised in formal judicial proceedings.
Other procedural arrangements, such as ex parte judicial review of
counsel's decision not to raise the issue, a second opinion by a disin-
terested lawyer, or consultation with a forensic mental health profes-
sional can protect the constitutional values at stake. These
approaches would substitute the attorney's informed judgment about
the client's competence (in relation to the actual need for client partic-
ipation in the particular case) for the formal evaluation and, possibly,
adjudication, which are now thought to be required.86
This suggestion may seem to require a significant departure from
existing constitutional doctrine. I would argue, however, that it is
actually more compatible with prevailing constitutional principles
than the current practice of routine judicial involvement. First, I am
not proposing a modification of the defendant's underlying substantive
right not to be convicted while incompetent. Instead, I am arguing
that procedural due process does not always require the defense attor-
84. See Paul A. Chernoff & William G. Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill Ethical
Quicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 505 (1972); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer
of the Court?, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 65.
85. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2 and
accompanying commentary at 177-83; see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. 1986);
State v. Haskins, 407 N.W.2d 309 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
86. It also follows that the process of evaluation and treatment should be more fully within
the attorney's control. Professor Winick has proposed that the court should routinely grant
continuances upon the request of counsel and that other judicial involvement should be
severely limited. See Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial, supra note 16, at 281-84. In
practice, attorneys appear to seek clinical assessment in about half of the cases in which they
doubt their clients' mental capacity to participate in the defense. In the other cases, the
attorneys seek consultation from a colleague or the participation of a client's relative. See
Steven K. Hoge et al., Attorney-Client Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: Client Competence
and Participation as Perceived by Their Attorneys, 10 BEHAV. SC. & L. 385 (1992).
[Vol. 47:539
DUSKY AND DROPE
ney to bring her doubts about a defendant's competence to judicial
attention.8 7 In the context of treatment refusals by involuntarily com-
mitted psychiatric patients, application of the constitutionally
required criteria by clinical decisionmakers satisfies due process;8 and
in the context of admission to a mental hospital by an "assenting"
patient, a clinician may make any constitutionally required compe-
tence determination.8 9
The logic of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence powerfully rein-
forces the argument that attorney decisionmaking regarding client
competence satisfies the procedural requirement of the Due Process
Clause. The constitutional obligation of attorneys to provide effective
representation entails a wide sphere of discretion to define and imple-
ment the strategic objectives of the defense.' Courts are properly
reluctant to intrude upon the attorney-client relationship for the pur-
pose of monitoring attorney performance. 91 In more general terms,
the Sixth Amendment protects the autonomy of the attorney and cli-
ent to present the defense as they see fit without unwarranted
prosecutorial or judicial interference.92
No reason exists, in principle, why defense attorneys cannot
make reasonable judgments regarding whether a defendant's mental
disabilities are significant enough to impede adequate preparation of
the defense. As a practical matter, attorneys may need clinical assist-
ance to recognize deficits that might not be evident to the attorney or
to compensate for any impairments that are evident. But indigent
defendants should have access to such clinical evaluation and assist-
ance as a matter of right, within the framework of the Sixth Amend-
ment and the attorney-client relationship, rather than as a feature of
an extrinsic judicial obligation to resolve doubts about a defendant's
competence.
93
87. As noted in the Preface, Professor Winick utilized a different route to reach the same
destination. See supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text. He argued that the attorney
should be authorized to waive the incompetency plea on behalf of an assenting, but possibly
incompetent, client. Id. However, my argument is not grounded in a waiver theory; I am
arguing that the attorney is in the best position to determine whether the defendant is
competent to assist counsel.
88. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
89. Zinermon v. Burch, 493 U.S. 113 (1990). See generally Winick, Competency to
Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization, supra note 4.
90. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-90 (1984).
91. Id. at 689-90.
92. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406
U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972).
93. A stronger case can be made for such assistance under the Sixth Amendment, or under
the due process right to develop a defense, than the case for evaluation and assistance in
developing an insanity defense as recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Indeed,
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Another important advantage of this proposed reformulation of
the procedures relating to pretrial competence determinations is that
it would avoid a controversial feature of current policy and practice.
Defense attorneys currently have an obligation to seek a competence
assessment whenever they have a "good faith doubt" about client
competence, regardless of the client's preferences or the attorney's
own judgment that raising the issue is not in the defendant's best
interests. Moreover, in some cases, the attorney may have to disclose
client statements to demonstrate the factual basis for the requested
evaluation. a4 If the process of clinical evaluation and assistance were
brought entirely within the attorney-client relationship, these consid-
erations would be alleviated, if not erased.
In sum, I am proposing that the law explicitly confer authority
on attorneys to make the decisions which they now must make in the
shadow of an ambiguous obligation to seek judicial resolution. When
the attorney concludes that the client lacks the necessary capacities to
assist counsel, and if adequate clinical intervention is not otherwise
available, the attorney may be obligated, as a last resort, to seek a
judicial determination of incompetence and an order of commitment.
The necessity of such a procedure should be left to the defense attor-
ney,95 subject, of course, to the constitutional obligation to provide
effective assistance of counsel.
The central role that defense attorneys inevitably play in deciding
how to respond to clients with mental disabilities calls attention to a
more general point that underlies many of the ideas developed in this
the Ake right is easily transformed into a more general right to have access to the evaluative
and consultative services of a mental health expert to assist the attorney in carrying out his
obligation to provide effective representation, in all of its aspects.
As a corollary, the attorney would have an obligation to seek necessary clinical evaluation
and assistance to help resolve representational difficulties. An inept performance by the
attorney would, of course, invalidate a defendant's conviction if it amounts to constitutionally
deficient representation under Strickland.
94. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.2(e) and
accompanying commentary at 182.
95. Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Mich. 1966) is an excellent illustration of
constitutionally deficient performance by counsel who failed to invoke the bar against
adjudication where the client was unable to assist counsel. For a closer case which does not
reveal whether the defendant's impairments affected the reliability of adjudication, see People
v. Baldwin, 541 N.E.2d 1315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
Greater reliance on attorney decisionmaking, in lieu of formal judicial involvement, raises
the possibility of conflicts of interest. The attorney may prefer to proceed despite the
defendant's impairments, both because the defendant cannot monitor the attorney's
performance and because raising the issue could increase the amount of time that must be
spent on the case. Of course, current legal rules may not substantially diminish the risks of




Article. Issues relating to adequacy of attorney performance often
masquerade as issues of client competence. If the primary objective is
to assure that the interests of mentally disabled defendants have ade-
quate protection, attention should be focused less on whether a partic-
ular defendant is "competent" and more on whether the attorney has
taken appropriate steps to identify client impairments, to seek clinical
assistance in assessing and responding to these impairments, and to
assure that any persisting impairments do not compromise prepara-
tion or presentation of a reasonable defense. If courts doubt the
capacities of attorneys to carry out these obligations, then the focus
should be on raising the level of attorney representation, not "restor-
ing" the competence of defendants.
IV. DECISIONAL COMPETENCE
I have argued that decisional competence should be distinguished
conceptually and doctrinally from competence to assist counsel.96
Although the relevant psychological capacities may be highly corre-
lated, decisionmaking about defense strategy encompasses cognitive
skills and capacities for rational thinking that assisting counsel, as
defined in Dusky and Drope, does not require. It is possible to define
a single, broad construct of "adjudicative competence" to encompass
decisionmaking capacities as well as those required for assisting coun-
sel.97 However, conceptualizing competence as a unitary construct is
undesirable for many reasons: it would prescribe a single test of com-
petence for normatively diverse decisions; it would be incompatible
with the contextual or "specific" approach to decisional capacities
that the law now generally reflects; and it would unnecessarily bar
adjudication in cases where alternative responses to incompetence are
available.
Existing law on this subject is unsettled, but the view that deci-
sional competence is a separate construct provides the best "fit" with
prevailing law and practice. The criteria for competence to waive
counsel are distinct from, and more demanding than, the criteria for
"competence to stand trial."98 Courts also have explicitly held that
the tests for competence to plead guilty, waive constitutional rights,
and "waive" an insanity plea are distinct from, and more demanding
than, the test for competence to stand trial.99 Moreover, even when
96. See supra part II.B.
97. See supra pp. 217.
98. See supra pp. 213-21.
99. See, e.g., Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Godinez
v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992) (waiver of constitutional rights); Briggs v. United States, 525
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courts have said that competence is a unitary construct, the results
actually reached often belie this assertion.10°
I have thus far sought to establish that decisional competence is
conceptually distinct from competence to assist counsel and that the
criteria for decisional competence differ from one context to another.
Therefore, the tasks remain to identify alternative tests for decisional
competence and to suggest how demanding the test should be in the
various decisionmaking contexts that arise in criminal defense.
To this end, I will first summarize the law relating to the defend-
ant's decisionmaking prerogatives in criminal defense. Next, I will
present a menu of available tests for decisional competence in crimi-
nal defense derived from the literature on treatment decisionmaking
and the relevant case law on decisional competence in criminal cases.
Then, drawing on these materials, I will sketch my own tentative
views regarding the tests of decisional competence that should be used
in various contexts. I use a distinctly normative approach here, but
my analysis yields results that are fully compatible with background
norms in criminal adjudication, with implicit theories of autonomy in
mental health law, and with the intuitions of judges and lawyers that
are embedded in existing practice.
A. Decisions in Criminal Defense
Many types of decisions can arise during the course of defending
a criminal case. Most of these, such as decisions concerning investiga-
tion, discovery, pretrial motions, and trial and appellate strategy,
counsel can quite properly make alone without the defendant's direct
participation. Although many of these decisions may, in effect, waive
constitutional rights, they do not require personal participation by the
defendant; counsel acts on the defendant's behalf, and binds the
defendant, subject of course to Sixth Amendment standards of ade-
quate representation. 10 However, several specific contexts legally
and ethically require a defendant's personal participation. The
defendant must personally waive several constitutional protections,
A.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (insanity plea); Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.
1981) (guilty plea).
100. For example, some courts appear to include a demanding standard of decisional
competence, along the lines of "reasoned choice," in the single test. They uphold convictions,
however, even in the face of strong doubts about decisional competence, if the defendant was
clearly competent to assist counsel as defined in Dusky and if no reason arises for concern
about the reliability of the conviction. See, e.g., Suldon v. State, 580 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991); People v. Heral, 323 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
101. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (waiver of constitutional objection to
admissibility of psychiatric testimony by failure to preserve it on direct appeal).
[Vol. 47:539
DUSKY AND DROPE
including the cluster of rights effected by a guilty plea, 10 2 the right to
a jury trial,10 3 the right to testify, l°4 and the right to be present at
trial. '05
Significantly, the constitutional requirement of personal waiver
of a particular right does not necessarily entail the broader proposi-
tion that the attorney has an enforceable duty to elicit a decision by
the client to invoke the right. Therefore, the principle of self-determi-
nation underlying the waiver cases is one-directional. When counsel
makes a decision to assert, rather than waive, these constitutional
rights, no definitive rule of law appears to require client participa-
tion,"°6 even though applicable standards of professional practice and
ethical guidelines obligate the attorney to elicit client decisionmaking
on these issues.1
0 7
The client prerogatives to define the basic objectives of represen-
tation and to select the main theory of defense lie at the core of the
idea that the client acts as the principal and the attorney as the agent
in legal representation. This implies that the attorney must accede to
the client's wishes in regard to these fundamental choices. But the
distinction between "objectives" and "means" of representation is not
particularly helpful in defining the decisionmaking prerogatives of
attorney and client.' For example, some otherwise tactical deci-
sions, involving professional risk-benefit judgment, may implicate
deeply held personal values of the defendant. Because the defense of
insanity implicates a defendant's personal values more than any other
defensive theory, the decision to invoke or forego the insanity defense
now is generally held to belong to the client. 10 9 Other defensive
claims may also have substantial personal meaning in particular
cases. 110
Sorting decisions into categories-into a sphere of client deci-
102. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
103. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278-81 (1942).
104. E.g., United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (1lth Cir. 1992) (en banc).
105. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24 (1988) (dictum).
106. See, e.g., Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937
(1986) (rejection of prosecution's plea offer by attorney without personal participation by the
client does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under circumstances of this case).
107. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 31(e) and cmt. e
(Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1990).
108. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
109. For an elaborate discussion of the general allocation of decisionmaking prerogatives in
the course of addressing the insanity plea, see Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1988).
110. If the client insists on raising a defense of entrapment, should the client's preferences
be ignored? Moreover, cross-examining a prosecution witness, clearly a matter of tactics, also
implicates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. If the attorney would not
otherwise cross-examine a witness, should the client's contrary instructions be followed?
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sions and a residual category of decisions within attorney control-is
neither sensible in theory nor compatible with judicial practice. On
the one hand, the legally enforced sphere of client control must fall
short of what might be widely regarded as the preferred professional
practice. To say that an attorney should promote client participation
on all important decisions regarding defense of the case is not to say
that courts should overturn convictions because the attorney failed to
do so. Further, to say that the client must personally make a decision
to waive a jury trial is not to say that the client must make a decision
to have a jury trial. Respect for client autonomy may require that the
defendant have an opportunity to decide, but in the absence of a cli-
ent's insistence on waiving a jury trial, the attorney probably has free-
dom to request one.
On the other hand, the attorney probably has an obligation to
adhere to the preferences of an insistent client even on matters relat-
ing to legal strategy and tactics. To say that the attorney has no pre-
sumptive obligation to secure an informed client decision on whether
to raise an entrapment defense, or to seek a lesser-included defense
instruction, or to forego cross-examining a key prosecution witness, is
not to say that the attorney is free to ignore the client's objections to
such decisions.
B. Tests of Decisional Competence in Criminal Adjudication
Although forensic experts have not yet conceptualized the
clinical content of alternative tests of decisional competence in the
context of criminal defense, the formulations developed by Appel-
baum and Grisso in their continuing research on decisional compe-
tence for medical treatment can be used as a starting point.' The
conceptual terrain, according to Appelbaum and Grisso, includes
abilities to (1) communicate a choice; (2) understand information; (3)
appreciate the significance of information in relation to one's own sit-
uation; and (4) engage in a process of rational manipulation, or rea-
soning, about the information. These tasks are not necessarily
hierarchical with regard to the required cognitive functions: a person
who is able to engage in a rational process of reasoning may not be
able to appreciate the significance of the information in her own situa-
tion; a person who is able to reason rationally may experience such
profound ambivalence and emotional instability as to be unable to
express a stable preference; or the threshold of required understand-
ing may be set so high that a person who is able to engage in certain
111. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to
Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635 (1988).
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basic reasoning tasks may not be able to understand the information
that must be manipulated.
From the standpoint of legal doctrine, however, it is useful to
arrange these abilities in a practical hierarchy of "tests" with succes-
sively more inclusive criteria in the following sequence: (1) a "prefer-
ence" test, which is defined to include only the ability to express a
preference; (2) an "understanding" test, which is defined to include
the ability to express a preference and the ability to understand rele-
vant information; (3) an "appreciation" test, which is defined to
include the abilities to express a preference, to understand relevant
information and to appreciate the significance of the information in
one's own case; and (4) a "reasoning" test, which includes the abilities
to express a preference, to understand relevant information, to appre-
ciate the significance of the information as applied to oneself and to
process the information in a rational manner to reach a decision.1 12
Building on this foundation, and on the skimpy case law on decisional
competence in criminal adjudication, 13 I will present a menu of five
progressively more inclusive legal tests. (As will be explained below,
this menu includes five tests rather than four because I have subdi-
vided the Appelbaum-Grisso "appreciation" concept into two sepa-
112. This hierarchical arrangement, in a ladder sequence, generally tracks the relations
among the "tests" as the courts seem to perceive them and is also the most plausible
arrangement from a normative perspective:
(1) Ability to express a choice is a necessary condition for a finding of
competence; the only issue is whether it should be regarded as a sufficient
condition.
(2) Logically, understanding information is a necessary precondition for the
abilities to appreciate and reason about that information. A court could, of
course, prescribe such a sophisticated level of understanding for legally effective
decisionmaking that a person who has no deficits in appreciation or basic
reasoning ability would nonetheless lack the capacity to understand the necessary
information. It would not be normatively plausible, however, for a court to
prescribe such a sophisticated level of understanding as a test for competence.
(For example, a court may require understanding of legal doctrine and
procedures as a prerequisite for self-representation, but this is not a requirement
of decisional competence.)
(3) Appreciation and rational manipulation are not hierarchical in
functional terms, and a competence test conceivably could exclude either ability.
In practice, however, I am not aware of any context in which a court has adopted
a "reasoning ability" requirement for decisional competence while expressly
refusing to take into account delusions and other impairments of appreciation.
At the same time, the case law is replete with decisions finding defendants
decisionally incompetent due to deficits in appreciation. Although case law does
not explicitly address the issue, it is normatively plausible to adopt an
appreciation test without also including, as a further ground for incompetence,
deficits in ability to process information rationally.
113. Decisions regarding the insanity defense and guilty pleas are summarized and
discussed in Bonnie, Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 49, at 308-14.
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rate tests-a minimal appreciation test which I have labeled a "basic
rationality" test and a more demanding, and more elastic, test of sub-
stantial appreciation.)
1. EXPRESS A PREFERENCE
The least demanding legal test of decisional competence is the
ability to communicate a preference. A defendant who is unable to
express a choice or who is unable to maintain a stable preference, is
not competent to decide whatever questions the client may be permit-
ted or required to decide. However, the mere ability to express a pref-
erence is not likely to be regarded as a sufficient measure of
competence in many legal contexts, and is especially unsuitable in the
context of criminal defense."I4 Moreover, a bare expression of a pref-
erence, without any understanding, is hardly a meaningful exercise of
self-determination. "15
2. BASIC UNDERSTANDING
The ability to understand relevant information about a particular
decision is the criterion most often utilized both in treatment settings
and in criminal defense. Clients who cannot understand the relevant
considerations after they have been conveyed, or who cannot under-
stand their own prerogatives as a "decisionmaker," lack the compe-
tence to make a decision, even if their only decision is whether to
accept or reject the attorney's advice. An "understanding" test can
vary in stringency according to which considerations are regarded as
relevant, therefore requiring understanding by the defendant. In the
context of treatment decisionmaking, the focus is on the ability to
understand the risks and benefits, or advantages and disadvantages, of
the treatment options. The equivalent inquiry in criminal defense
decisionmaking would encompass the defendant's ability to under-
stand the advantages and disadvantages of choosing one decisional
option (e.g. jury trial) or the other (e.g. bench trial). However, the
case law suggests that what I will call the basic understanding test for
decisional competence in criminal defense has a more limited reach.
The issue typically arises in the context of decisions to waive constitu-
tional protections. As a result, the basic understanding test in crimi-
114. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
115. The law may only require simple "assent" to an attorney's recommendation in some
contexts; however, in such cases the law does not insist on the defendant's personal




nal defense refers to the ability to understand that which must be
understood to effect a valid waiver of constitutional rights.
In most contexts, a valid waiver requires understanding the
nature of the right and the consequences of waiving it. The definition
of what must be understood may be made more or less inclusive. For
example, a defendant who waives a right to a jury trial must be able to
understand that a judge, rather than a group of people from the com-
munity, will make the decision about his guilt or innocence." 6 But
the defendant probably does not have to be able to understand the
selection process, including the concept of peremptory challenges."
7
Similar questions can apply to the waivers of other rights such as the
waiver of the right to testify and the waivers implicit in guilty pleas.
3. APPRECIATION
The legal criteria for a valid waiver do not encompass the per-
son's reasons for deciding to waive."I The key question in criminal
defense, as in other contexts, is which abilities required for rational
choice should also be regarded as necessary for decisional compe-
tence. Aside from the ability to express a preference and a basic
understanding of the nature and consequences of the decision, should
anything else be required? A defendant who is able to comprehend
relevant information may be unable to appreciate the significance of
that information in her own case. Problems in appreciating the situa-
tion and its consequences may arise due to limitations in cognitive
capacity, to disturbances of thought, or to affective disorders.
Problems in appreciation appear most often in cases involving
psychotic defendants who deny their illnesses, or whose delusions or
affective impairments pathologically distort their beliefs about the
desirability or undesirability of a difficult course of action.
a. Minimum Appreciation (Basic Rationality)
Consider a possibly innocent defendant who insists on accepting
a plea bargain, against counsel's advice, because he believes that the
devil will prevent all defense witnesses from appearing at his trial. Or
consider a defendant who insists on waiving a jury trial, against coun-
sel's advice, because she believes that the judge and he have the same
"earth mother." Each of these defendants may have sufficient under-
116. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir.
1983).
117. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wandick v. Chrans, 869 F.2d 1084, 1088 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing DeRobertis, 715 F.2d at 1178).
118. The defendant's reasons for choosing to waive the particular right have relevance only
if the defendant succumbs to coercive threats.
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standing of the rights being waived to effect a valid waiver. Yet, I am
confident that no court would regard these defendants as decisionally
competent." 9 Even the least demanding approaches to decisional
competence in most other legal contexts include some minimal
dimension of appreciation to exclude cases of gross irrationality. 120
The basic rationality test adds an additional element to the "basic
understanding" test-that the defendant be able to express a reason
for the decision that has a plausible grounding in reality. 12' Although
the "rational understanding" component of Dusky implicitly includes
this additional element, it is rarely at issue in relation to decisional
competence per se because gross delusions are likely also to affect the
defendant's competence to assist counsel. 2 2 In the rare case where
the delusion only affects a particular decision, 23 isolating the defend-
ant's decisional incompetence affords dispositional flexibility not
available under the unitary Dusky formula.
b. Substantial Appreciation
Because it permits findings of decisional incompetence only in
extreme cases, the "basic rationality" test represents only a modest
interference with the defendant's decisionmaking prerogatives. The
"substantial appreciation test" provides a more elastic formula than
the "basic rationality" test for taking into account cognitive and emo-
tional factors which impair a person's ability to relate what she
"understands" about the reasons for choosing one or another course
of action to her own situation. The criterion is sufficiently flexible to
take into account the subtleties of mental disorder. Thus, a defendant
may be able to give plausible, non-delusional reasons for reaching a
certain decision, thereby satisfying the basic rationality test, but the
119. I am assuming in all illustrative cases that the defendant is competent to assist counsel
as defined above. In each of these cases, the defendant insists on acting contrary to counsel's
advice for wholly irrational reasons. The client's competence is often put in issue in cases of
this kind and courts virtually always find these defendants incompetent. In contrast, the
client's decisional competence is rarely an issue when she accedes to counsel's advice. The
exception concerns defendants with mental retardation. Consequently, cases concerning the
proper test for competence to plead guilty usually involve defendants with mental retardation.
See, e.g., Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d
721 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
120. See Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental
Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978); Saks, supra note 3.
121. For a discussion of the advantages of a "gross delusion" test in the context of
treatment refusals, see Saks, supra note 3.
122. See, e.g., State v. Champagne, 497 A.2d 1242, 1245 (N.H. 1985) (defendant's delusions
clearly impaired capacity to appreciate situation as defendant in criminal prosecution,
although the defense raised the issue as decisional incompetence to enter insanity plea).
123. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216 (Wash. 1983).
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decision may nonetheless be so powerfully influenced by delusional
beliefs or pathological emotions that it should not be binding.124
4. REASONED CHOICE
A defendant who is able to understand information relevant to a
decision and is able to appreciate the meaning of the decision in his
situation may nonetheless lack the capacity to use logical processes to
compare the benefits and risks of the decisional options. As noted
above, Appelbaum and Grisso t25 use the phrase rational manipulation
of information to refer to the process of weighing information to reach
a decision. What is important here is the decisional process, not its
outcome, although if others consider an outcome to be misguided or
irrational, this may signal a problem with the defendant's reasoning
process. Organic deficits, retardation, psychotic thought disorder,
delirium and dementia, extreme phobia or panic, anxiety, euphoria
and depression may impair a defendant's capacity to weigh informa-
tion in order to make rational choices, consistent with starting prem-
ises and assigned values. The reasoned choice test, adopted by some
courts in relation to competence to plead guilty or to waive counsel, 1
26
appears to encompass both an appreciation criterion and the capaci-
ties for rational manipulation described by Appelbaum and Grisso.'27
Figure 1 depicts the five legal "tests" for decisional competence
in criminal adjudication. Each test in this cumulative sequence is
more demanding in the sense that additional capacities are added to
the criteria specified for competence. The choice of a test of compe-
tence in a particular decisionmaking context should take into account
the consequences, for both the defendant and society, of determina-
tions of competence and incompetence in that particular context.
Moreover, what is expected of defendants in relation to decisionmak-
ing should be anchored in a practical understanding of the attorney-
client relationship, and in a theory of client autonomy in criminal
defense. In the following pages I will present my own views regarding
the principles that should guide the choice of criteria for decisional
competence in criminal adjudication. The theoretical framework
124. Conceptually, what I call the "basic rationality" test is actually a weak version of what
Appelbaum and Grisso call the "appreciation" test. The ability to give a plausible reason for
one's choice requires minimal ability to appreciate one's situation. I characterize this as a
"separate" legal test because this level of rationality may be regarded as requisite to a valid
"choice," even if the courts may be reluctant to pursue a more qualitative inquiry.
125. Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note I 1, at 1636.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Seiling v.
Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 214-15 (9th Cir. 1973).
127. Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 111, at 1636.
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presented up to this point, however, stands on its own and is norma-
tively neutral regarding the choice of tests of competence. Accord-
Figure 1








Ability to express a stable preference
.........................................................................
+ Ability to understand nature and
consequences of decision
+ Ability to express plausible (i.e., not grossly
irrational) reasons for the decision
.........................................................................
+ Ability to understand reasons for alternative
courses of action (risks and benefits);
+ Ability to appreciate significance of this
information in one's own case
.........................................................................
+ Ability to use logical processes to compare
and weigh risks and benefits of alternative
courses of action
ingly, acceptance of the framework leaves the reader entirely free to
reject the prescriptive ideas outlined in the remainder of this Part of
the article.
C. The Significance of Counsel's Advice
In the Preface, I summarized Professor Bruce Winick's proposal
to allow waiver of the incompetence plea by an assenting defendant
acting on counsel's advice.1 28 Implicit in this proposal is the norma-
tive view that the legal test for competence should differ according to
whether the defendant follows or rejects counsel's advice. I endorse
this proposition explicitly. 29 As demonstrated elsewhere in the con-
text of decisions on insanity pleas, I also believe that this proposition
accurately describes existing practice. 30 When the defendant pleads
insanity on counsel's recommendation, the operational test of compe-
128. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
129. Whether the criteria for competence to accept or refuse recommended treatment
should differ is a matter of debate in the bioethics literature. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock,
Decisionmaking Competence and Risk, 5 BIOETHICS 105 (1991); Saks, supra note 3; Mark R.
Wicclair, Patient Decisionmaking Capacity and Risk, 5 BIOETHICS 91 (1991).
130. Bonnie, Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 49, at 309-11.
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tence is "basic understanding" (factual understanding suffices); thus,
the defendant is described as "competent to stand trial." However,
when the defendant refuses to plead insanity, but the attorney doubts
the client's rationality, assessment of the defendant's competence
encompasses her reasons for rejecting the defense. Once the issue is
raised, impairments of appreciation appear relevant to judicial con-
ceptions of competence. Finally, if the defendant is found competent
to "stand trial" (i.e., assist counsel) but not competent to "waive" the
insanity plea, surrogate decisionmaking (usually by the attorney) is
permitted. The competence of "refusing" defendants has been liti-
gated almost entirely in the context of refusals to plead insanity, but I
think the applicable legal principles can be generalized.
1. DECISIONS IN ACCORD WITH COUNSEL'S ADVICE
In general, "basic understanding" (capacity to understand the
nature and consequences of the proposed decision) is a suitable test of
competence for decisions, including those waiving constitutional
rights, that the defendant makes in accord with counsel's advice; 131
mental impairments or deficits bearing on the defendant's reasons for
following counsel's advice ordinarily lack legal significance. No use-
ful purpose would be achieved in this context by increasing the com-
petence requirement beyond basic understanding. A risk exists, of
course, that the decision is not in the defendant's best interests, but
this danger relates to the deficiencies of counsel's decisionmaking and
would not be reduced substantially by raising the test for the defend-
ant's competence.' 32 Moreover, any aggregate gain in protection of
the defendants' interests (in reducing agency costs, as it were) that
would be achieved if the test were strengthened clearly does not suf-
fice to justify the costs of administering a higher standard of
competence.
It could also be argued that a more meaningful exercise of self-
determination by criminal defendants has value in itself, even if the
outcome of the decisionmaking process would not be affected.
131. The discussion in the Article pertains only to those decisions that require the
defendant's personal participation. Decisions to invoke constitutional protections, rather than
waive them, may not require the defendant's personal participation as a matter of law, even
though it is customarily sought as a matter of professional practice. In other words, a court
will not reverse a conviction because the defendant was not given an opportunity to plead
guilty or to opt for a bench trial, and questionable competence to make those decisions
therefore would be immaterial.
132. In theory, exposing counsel's decisions to more demanding scrutiny by clients and the
courts would serve a "checking" or monitoring function, but effective client monitoring
requires a much higher level of client participation than a marginal adjustment in the test of
decisional competence likely would achieve.
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Increasing client participation in criminal defense is a worthwhile
objective, but achievement of such an aspirational norm requires
major changes in the practice of criminal defense. A more demanding
test of competence would not have much impact on the relative roles
played by attorneys and clients. The purpose of the competence
requirement is to establish the minimum conditions for autonomous
participation. From this standpoint, the necessary conditions are
ordinarily satisfied if the client is aware that she has the prerogative to
decline the attorney's advice, and is able to understand the nature and
consequences of the decision.
Only decisions to plead guilty should be subject to a more
demanding test than basic understanding. In this context, a "basic
rationality" test is appropriate. Under this test, the plea would not be
valid, even if the defendant adequately understands the nature and
consequences of a guilty plea, if none of the defendant's reasons for
pleading guilty has any plausible grounding in reality (i.e., if all the
defendant's reasons for pleading guilty rest on patently false beliefs
about the world.) This exception is rooted in the dignity rationale for
the competence requirement.133 However, as long as the defendant
enters the plea on advice of counsel, the test for competence should
not be any more demanding than the basic rationality test. In this
respect, I disagree with the cases that hold that the test for compe-
tence to plead guilty is "ability to make a reasoned choice among
alternatives." Rigorous application of such a test would deny defend-
ants with mental disabilities the advantages of plea bargaining.
Admittedly, the plea bargaining process can victimize defendants
with mental disability, especially if they are poorly represented by
defense counsel. However, this is a problem of quality assurance, not
autonomy. If attention to "competence" should be enhanced in this
context, it should be directed toward the competence of counsel, not
the competence of the defendant. In this context, the most important
concern is reliability, not autonomy. Accordingly, special care should
be exercised to assure that the plea is based on a reliable factual
foundation. 134
133. Bonnie, Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 49, at 313.
134. Courts are not inclined to preclude guilty pleas by defendants with mental illness or
mental retardation, or to invalidate them later, unless the waiver has questionable validity or
the prosecution inadequately establishes the reliability of the conviction. For recent examples
of decisions rejecting claims of decisional incompetence, see, e.g., State v. Bailey, 464 N.W.2d
626 (S.D. 1991); State ex rel. Wilson v. Hedrick, 379 S.E.2d 493 (W. Va. 1989); Suldon v.
State, 580 N.E.2d 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). For one of the rare decisions invalidating guilty
pleas (entered with counsel's advice), see Matusiak v. Kelly, 786 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1986). The
facts of Matusiak raise doubts about both the validity of the waiver and the reliability of the
conviction. For a general discussion of problems associated with guilty pleas by defendants
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2. DECISIONS REJECTING COUNSEL'S ADVICE
Disagreement with counsel is not, in itself, evidence of incompe-
tence. Counsel's advice may reflect poor judgment or may fail to take
adequate account of the defendant's values and preferences. Defend-
ant's behavior may also be associated with oppositional personality
traits that do not amount to legal incompetence. However, under
some circumstances, rejection of counsel's advice raises legitimate
doubts regarding the defendant's capacity for rational decisionmak-
ing. At a minimum, when the attorney has genuine doubts about the
defendant's decisional competence, she has a duty to take appropriate
steps to obtain clinical consultation. In many instances, the problem
will be resolved. Assuming, however, that the disagreement persists,
the underlying ethical and legal dilemma must be confronted.
Unless the defendant is decisionally incompetent, his preferences
bind the attorney. The choice of a test of competence turns on this
question: How paternalistic should the legal system be when defend-
ants insist on pursuing courses of action that attorneys consider
adverse to the defendant's own best interests? Ideally, the answer
should be based upon data regarding the distribution of abilities relat-
ing to "rational decisionmaking" in the general population of criminal
defendants, and regarding the relation between these abilities and
mental disorder. Unfortunately, systematic research on these issues
has only recently begun. In the absence of such information, it is
premature to express any definitive views on the appropriate test.
However, in order to provoke further discussion, I will outline what
strikes me as a plausible view.
In most contexts involving decisions made against advice of
counsel, the "appreciation" test strikes the appropriate balance
between paternalistic intuitions and respect for the defendant's pre-
rogatives.135 In a few contexts, however, such a substantial risk of
injustice exists that the test of competence should be strengthened to
include not only appreciation but a capacity for reasoned choice (i.e. a
capacity to compare and weigh alternative courses of action in a logi-
cal manner). This test should be used when the defendant waives rep-
resentation by counsel or insists on pleading guilty without counsel or
against the advice of counsel. In those contexts, the tension between
reliability and autonomy should be resolved in favor of a particularly
with mental retardation, see Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Retardation, supra note 82, at 435-46.
135. In some contexts, however, basic rationality would provide an acceptable alternative
because adhering to the defendant's preference does not pose a significant risk of injustice.
One such context would be a decision waiving jury trial against counsel's advice.
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demanding test of competence. Generally, the case law fits this
pattern. 
136
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR EVALUATION PROTOCOLS
Differentiating in this way between assenting and refusing
defendants facilitates efficiency in forensic assessment of decisional
competence. 137 Assuming that "basic understanding" is the test for
decisional competence by assenting defendants, a defendant's capacity
to understand the nature and consequences of the key decisions that
he may be required to make can be assessed simultaneously with his
ability to assist counsel. It is not clear, empirically, whether the abil-
ity to understand that which must be understood to establish compe-
tence to assist counsel predicts the ability to understand the nature
and consequences of decisions to plead guilty, to waive jury trial, to
testify etc., or whether one of these predicts the others. These ques-
tions are now being researched. 38 Depending on the empirical rela-
tion among these "abilities to understand," the appropriate
assessment tools can be used at the time of the initial evaluation.
Accordingly, at the time of this initial assessment, it will be possible in
most cases to provide a report on the defendant's competence to assist
counsel and on the defendant's decisional competence-insofar as the
decisions are eventually made in accord with counsel's advice.
For defendants regarded as competent at the time of the initial
assessment, further evaluation will be required only in the small frac-
tion of cases in which the defendant's mental condition changes or in
which the defendant resists counsel's advice in a manner which leads
136. In addition to cases cited from the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., United States v. Johns, 728
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kincaid, 362 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1966); State v.
Bishop, 781 P.2d 581 (Ariz. 1989); People v. Russell, 173 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969);
State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1976). For two recent cases that I believe courts
erroneously decided, see State v. Fayle, 658 P.2d 218 (Ariz. App. 1982); Wilkins v. State, 802
S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
137. Simultaneous, resolution of all doubts about competence provides one of the apparent
advantages of viewing competence in the criminal process as a unitary construct. The gain in
efficiency is largely illusory, however, because issues regarding decisionmaking ability often do
not arise until after the initial evaluation has been conducted. Any change in the defendant's
behavior or condition which presents new doubts about competence will require further
inquiry anyway, regardless of the test. Moreover, any gain in efficiency depends entirely on
prescribing a very low standard of decisional competence for all decisionmaking contexts. Yet,
an undemanding test of decisional competence is normatively undesirable in some contexts,
especially when the client "irrationally" refuses to make the choice that counsel believes to be
in the client's best interests. I strongly suspect that, in practice, courts apply a different and
higher standard in such cases, even if they proclaim to be applying a single test.
138. Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Mental Health
and the Law, Preliminary Report: The MacArthur Structured Assessment of Competencies of
Criminal Defendants, February 21, 1992 (on file with the author).
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counsel to doubt the defendant's ability to make rational choices.
Under these circumstances, the Sixth Amendment obligates counsel
to seek assistance. The main objective at this point is to resolve the
disagreement; clinical consultation may be helpful in this effort. In
the event that disagreement persists, however, clinical assessment of
the defendant's "competence," according to the applicable standard,
will be necessary to guide counsel's decision regarding her own obli-
gations and prerogatives.
4. ASSENT AND REFUSAL: A NOTE ABOUT ETHICS AND LAW
Controversy persists as to whether different competence criteria
for assents and refusals can be justified as a matter of ethical principle.
With one exception, however, I can defend my position here on the
narrower ground that different legal tests are warranted even if the
meaning of competence, in principle, does not differ. Assume, for
example, that the appreciation formula provides the preferable defini-
tion of competence in most significant decisionmaking contexts-i.e.,
basic decisions regarding trial strategy and basic theories of defense,
including whether or not to plead insanity. Where the defendant
refuses to accept counsel's recommendation to plead insanity, the test
of appreciation will be applied explicitly. However, where the defend-
ant accedes to counsel's recommendation, it would not make sense, as
a practical matter, to look deeper than basic cognitive understanding,
because a finding of competence or incompetence (under an apprecia-
tion test) would have the same consequence-i.e. the insanity plea will
be raised either way. If the defendant's appreciation is not impaired,
the defendant will raise the defense personally, and if his appreciation
is impaired, the attorney will raise the defense as surrogate decision-
maker. Thus, no practical reason prompts a look beneath cognitive
understanding in cases involving assenting clients.
This line of argument will not justify different competence crite-
ria for assenting and refusing clients who plead guilty. In principle,
the reasoned choice formula would seem to be ethically plausible,
given the consequences of a guilty plea. What then would explain a
less demanding legal test of competence for clients who plead guilty
on advice of counsel? It might be argued, as above, that there is no
practical need to look beneath the assenting client's basic understand-
ing of the nature and consequences of the plea, but this argument fails
because the defendant who has impaired abilities to think rationally
will not be permitted to plead guilty, and a surrogate guilty plea will
not be allowed. Thus, important consequences turn on which legal
test is used. Use of the reasoned choice test would increase signifi-
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cantly the costs of adjudication-by requiring more competence
determinations and by increasing the number of tried cases.
In a system that disposes of cases largely through plea negotia-
tion, the reasoned choice criterion of competence would not be in the
best interest of many mentally disabled defendants because it would
deny them the advantages of plea bargaining. Thus, in this one con-
text, differential criteria for assent and refusal must be defended in
explicitly paternalistic terms. On the one hand, the less demanding
basic rationality test is more likely than the reasoned choice test to
serve the interests of assenting defendants. On the other hand, the
"reasoned choice" standard is necessary to protect the interests of
defendants who insist on pleading guilty against advice of counsel.
D. Illustrative Applications: Bench or Jury Trial
Waiver of jury trial requires the defendant's personal participa-
tion, and practice guidelines typically require the defendant's involve-
Table 3
Tests of Decisional Competence: Bench or Jury Trial
Decision to Invoke Jury Trial
(with or against advice of counsel): Decisional Competence Not Required
Decision to Waive Jury Trial
(with advice of counsel): Basic Understanding Test
Decision to Waive Jury Trial
(against advice of counsel): Basic Rationality Test
ment in deciding whether a case should be tried before a judge or a
jury. As an illustrative exercise,139 I have explored the implications of
the theory outlined in this article for three permutations of attorney-
client interaction in this decisional context: (1) waiver of jury trial on
advice of counsel; (2) waiver of jury trial against advice of counsel;
and (3) invoking jury trial against advice of counsel. (See Table 3).140
1. WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL ON ADVICE OF COUNSEL
Test. The test for competence to waive the right to jury trial, in
favor of a bench trial, on advice of counsel should be (and probably is)
139. I have previously applied these ideas in the context of decisions about guilty pleas in
Bonnie, Theoretical Reformulation, supra note 49, at 311-14.
140. The fourth possibility, invoking jury trial on advice of counsel, raises no difficulties
because the governing law probably permits counsel to make the decision without the
defendant's participation. A court would not reverse a conviction on the ground that the




the ability to understand the nature and consequences of the decision.
Based on the existing case law, the defendant must be able to under-
stand that he has a constitutional right to have his guilt or innocence
decided by a group of people from the community and that if he
chooses to give up this right, the decision will be made by the judge
alone. 141 The "basic understanding" test is preferable to a more
demanding test because the decision by counsel to recommend a
bench trial presumptively reflects an informed professional judgment
regarding the probabilities of conviction under both procedures and
remains itself subject to scrutiny for constitutional inadequacy. In
addition, the choice between a jury trial and a bench trial will not
likely displace, subordinate, or overlook preferences or values of the
defendant unrelated to the goal of minimizing the probability of con-
viction. Finally, the very remote likelihood that the defendant will
have wholly irrational reasons for waiving a jury trial when counsel
has recommended this course does not justify the costs of administer-
ing a more demanding standard of competence that focuses on the
defendant's reasoning process or on the rationality of her reasons for
choosing a bench trial.
Monitoring. The Supreme Court has never decided whether
waiver of jury trial requires contemporaneous documentation on the
record or a colloquy with the defendant, which guilty pleas require.
14 2
If it were required, a proper colloquy could be designed to assure
actual understanding of the pertinent information. Perhaps, however,
the likelihood that attorneys will opt for a bench trial when it is not in
the defendant's interests to do so is too slight to warrant an extended
colloquy to document the validity of the waiver. If no colloquy were
required, the alternative strategy would be to elicit from the defendant
only an "expression of choice." In effect, expression of the defend-
ant's preference to waive jury trial would raise a conclusive presump-
tion of actual understanding (which itself assumes ability to
understand). 143
141. United States v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir. 1983). Other courts also
require that a defendant understand: that a jury is composed of 12 members of the
community, that the defendant may participate in the selection of jurors, and that the jury
verdict must be unanimous (or whatever the law provides regarding number of jurors and
unanimity). Eg., United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Delgado, 635 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1981).
142. Jells v. Ohio, 11 S. Ct. 1020 (1991) (Marshall, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari);
see also United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 880, 852 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that trial court's
failure to personally question defendants before accepting waiver of right to jury trial not
reversible error).
143. This statement contains a somewhat difficult and implicit constitutional theory. The
'expression of choice" would have the effect of insulating the waiver from direct challenge.
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Consequences of Decisional Incompetence. Surrogate decision-
making by the attorney would be appropriate if a defendant were able
to assist counsel, but were nonetheless unable to effect a valid waiver
of jury trial.'" A requirement of consultation with another attorney
would provide a contemporaneous documentation of the attorney's
reasoned choice and, under these circumstances, surrogate waiver
would be preferable to either of the alternatives-jury trial by default
or a bar against adjudication.
2. WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL AGAINST ADVICE OF COUNSEL
Test. The most sensible test for competence to waive a jury trial
against counsel's advice is not immediately apparent. Because history
and the constitutional text sanctify the right to a jury trial, waiver
should not be taken lightly. Yet, the waiver of jury trial rarely sacri-
fices the defendant's interests in a reliable adjudication. The basis for
paternalistic intervention is therefore somewhat more attenuated than
when the defendant insists on pleading guilty or pursuing an unprom-
ising theory of defense against counsel's advice. As a general proposi-
tion, I suggested earlier that decisional competence should be assessed
according to an appreciation test when the defendant rejects counsel's
advice (and counsel raises the issue). 145  In this context, though, I
think a "basic rationality" test suffices to vindicate the society's inter-
est in assuring that waiver of jury trial reflects a meaningful exercise
of self-determination. 1
4 6
Monitoring. A client's refusal to follow the attorney's recom-
mendation typically raises no genuine doubt about the client's compe-
Any claim designed to second guess the attorney's decision would have to be formulated as an
ineffective assistance claim. Thus, if the defendant subsequently claimed that her attorney
failed to explain the nature and consequences of the decision, the claim could prevail only if
the attorney's recommendation to opt for bench trial amounted to constitutionally deficient
performance. Similarly, if the defendant claimed, implausibly, that she was unable to
understand what she had been told, the claim would prevail only if the attorney's failure to
recognize or rectify the defendant's impaired understanding amounted to constitutionally
deficient performance.
144. As a practical matter, competence to waive jury trial (on advice of counsel) is unlikely
to arise as a discrete decisional competence issue. It is highly unlikely that a defendant who is
competent to assist counsel (and is able to understand the adversary system) would be unable
to understand the nature and consequences of a decision waiving a jury trial. Researchers are
now empirically testing this proposition. See supra note 138.
145. See supra part IV.B.3.
146. State v. Champagne, 492 A.2d 1242 (N.H. 1985), is illustrative. Champagne killed his
parents because he believed they were members of a band of "flesh eaters" who catch, sell, and
eat other people. Although the issue raised in the case concerned his competence to plead
insanity, one feature of his delusional thinking was the possibility that flesh eaters would be on
the jury. If he had waived jury trial on the basis of this belief, the court may have invalidated
the decision under the "basic rationality" test.
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tence. The defendant may reject counsel's advice because he assesses
the probabilities differently, weighs the alternatives differently, or
defines his self-interest differently. In some cases, the defendant's
obstinate or oppositional behavior expresses more general charactero-
logical propensities that define who the defendant "is" and do not
amount to incompetence. On some occasions, though, the defend-
ant's behavior signals a possible impairment of reasoning that should
trigger the attorney's obligation to inquire. Clinical assessment may
not be necessary. It may be sufficient for defense counsel to obtain a
"second opinion" from another attorney. If, based on clinical assess-
ment or other consultation, counsel concludes that the defendant
understands the nature and consequences of the waiver and has plau-
sible reasons for making the choice, the attorney should make a rec-
ord. To promote finality, it may also be desirable for the defense to
request an in camera hearing for the purpose of a judicial colloquy to
document the defendant's understanding and the plausibility of his
reasons.
Consequences of Decisional Incompetence. Conceivably, a
defendant could be competent to assist counsel, but decisionally
incompetent to waive the right to jury trial.'47 If so, surrogate deci-
sionmaking clearly would be the appropriate response. Barring adju-
dication would not be sensible; instead, the attorney should be
permitted, as surrogate, to invoke the constitutionally guaranteed
option.
3. INVOKING JURY TRIAL AGAINST ADVICE OF COUNSEL
Defendants sometimes insist on invoking a constitutional right
against counsel's advice. These instances usually include refusing a
proffered plea agreement in favor of a trial or, less frequently, insisting
on a jury trial in lieu of a recommended bench trial. Most often, the
defendant's competence is not in doubt in these cases. But let us
assume that a major mental disorder influences the defendant's deci-
sionmaking and that, as a result, it could plausibly be said that the
defendant has grossly irrational reasons for refusing to plead guilty or
for insisting on a jury trial or that these reasons reflect an impaired
appreciation of reality. Should this matter? Ultimately, the question
is whether decisional competence is required at all for decisions invok-
ing constitutional rights.
Let us consider the consequences of saying that the defendant is
147. Cf. McCarlo v. State, 677 P.2d 1268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (After determining that
McCarlo was competent to stand trial, the court separately analyzed whether McCarlo had
made a voluntary and knowledgeable waiver of his right to a jury trial.).
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permanently decisionally incompetent to reject a proposed plea agree-
ment. Neither a forced guilty plea or a surrogate guilty plea is legally
possible, so a bar to adjudication provides the only available response.
Would it make sense to foreclose adjudication, possibly permanently,
despite the competence of the defendant to assist counsel in preparing
for and conducting a trial? I do not think so. Incompetent rejection
of a plea agreement by the defendant should not bar a trial, the consti-
tutional default.
Apparent irrationality in decisionmaking should raise a red flag,
of course, and defense counsel would have an obligation, under pre-
vailing norms of adequate representation, to take appropriate steps to
secure clinical consultation and assessment. The assessment might
reveal more pervasive problems that raise doubts about the defend-
ant's competence to assist counsel. Even if competence to assist coun-
sel is not in doubt, therapeutic intervention and counseling may
resolve the conflict between attorney and client regarding whether to
try the case. But, if the defendant remains unwilling to accede to
counsel's advice, the case should go to trial. No requirement of deci-
sional competence qualifies the defendant's prerogative to reject a
guilty plea.
If what I have said about the prerogative to go to trial is sound, it
follows that the defendant also has an unqualified prerogative to
invoke a jury trial in the face of counsel's recommendation to opt for
a bench trial.
E. A Simplifying Proposal
I have sketched these ideas in order to stimulate discussion of the
factors that should be considered in defining and administering tests
of decisional competence in criminal adjudication, and have not taken
into account the practical problems raised by prescribing multiple
tests. If simplification into two tests were a paramount objective, I
would be inclined to condense these ideas as follows: (1) In all situa-
tions in which the defendant accedes to counsel's recommendation
regarding defense or disposition of the case, including guilty pleas, the
test should be "basic rationality." As I have noted earlier, this
approach, which encompasses the basic understanding of rights and
the consequences of waiving them, together with a requirement of
minimum rationality, is a fairly close approximation of the Dusky
formula, as applied to decisional competence. (2) When the defend-
ant waives counsel, or insists on acting contrary to counsel's advice in
a manner that raises doubts about the client's rationality, the test
should be "ability to make a reasoned choice," a formulation that
[ ol. 47:539
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should encompass a qualitative criterion of appreciation, together
with the cognitive abilities required for rational decisionmaking.
V. A COMMENT ON MORAN V. GODINEZ
The decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Moran v. Godinez, 48 now before the United States Supreme
Court on a writ of certiorari, raises some of the issues discussed in this
article, including the relation between competence to assist counsel
and decisional competence and the criteria for waiving representation
by counsel and pleading guilty. The Ninth Circuit's holding that the
"standard used to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial
is different from the standard used to determine competency to waive
constitutional rights" presents these issues.
149
Richard Moran was charged with three counts of capital murder
in Nevada for killing two people in a bar on August 2, 1984 and for
shooting his former wife in a separate incident seven days later.
1 50
Immediately after shooting his wife, Moran attempted suicide by
shooting himself in the abdomen and slashing his wrists. While in the
hospital recovering from his wounds, he summoned the police and
confessed to all three homicides. 5 ' Soon after discharge from the
hospital, he was referred for forensic assessment of his competence to
stand trial, and two examining psychiatrists interviewed him sepa-
rately on September 12 and September 17.152 Each psychiatrist con-
cluded that Moran understood the charges and was able to assist his
attorney.1 53 Taking note of his depression and remorse, one of the
psychiatrists observed that "Moran may not make the effort necessary
to assist counsel in his own defense." 5 4 The record also shows that
Moran was prescribed several depressants and anti-anxiety drugs dur-
ing the pretrial period.
55
Two months later, in November, Moran appeared in court,
"expressed extreme remorse" for the killings, discharged his counsel,
changed his pleas to guilty, refused the trial court's offer of standby
counsel, and announced that he wanted no mitigating evidence
148. 972 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. grantedsub nom. Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 810
(1992).
149. Moran, 972 F.2d at 266.
150. Id. at 264. Unless otherwise indicated, the factual summary in the text is drawn from
the Ninth Circuit opinion.
151. Moran v. State, 734 P.2d 712, 713 (Nev. 1987).
152. Moran, 972 F.2d at 267 n.7.
153. Id. at 268.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 264.
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presented on his behalf at the sentencing proceeding. 56 The trial
court accepted Moran's waiver of counsel and pleas of guilty after
conducting a plea colloquy during which Moran uttered "monosyl-
labic responses to leading questions from the court about his legal
rights and the charged offenses."' 157 In January, 1985, a three-judge
panel imposed death sentences for each of the three homicides.
58
The sentencing panel found that the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances in all three murders. 59 On
direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed two death
sentences and reversed the third. '6
Wholesale capitulation by remorseful capital defendants is not
unusual. Such defendants typically insist on pleading guilty against
counsel's advice and instruct counsel to refrain from introducing any
evidence in mitigation, or like Richard Moran, they discharge their
attorneys and plead guilty while unrepresented. These defendants
also frequently request sentences of death. This behavior presents
puzzling and controversial questions regarding the ethical and legal
obligations of defense attorneys and trial judges.' 6'
Capital defendants who have failed to defend themselves or seek
leniency at trial and who have received death sentences often regret
their behavior thereafter. They then file appeals or habeas petitions
seeking to nullify the convictions and death sentences they so ardently
sought. The possibility of strategic behavior in such cases cannot be
altogether ruled out, but the most likely explanation is that medica-
tion, counseling, and the passage of time alleviate the prisoners' acute
distress and they eventually come to prefer life, even with suffering
and guilt, to death. Moran filed his state habeas petition in July of
1987. 162 Among other claims, he alleged that he had not been compe-
tent to waive counsel or to enter valid guilty pleas in November of
1984 and that, in any event, the trial court had not undertaken a con-
stitutionally adequate inquiry regarding his competence to do so.' 63
After an evidentiary hearing, the state habeas court concluded
that Moran had been competent to waive counsel and to enter his




159. 734 P.2d at 713.
160. Id. at 715.
161. I have discussed these problems in Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, supra note
74.
162. Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 264 (9th Cir. 1992).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 264.
[Vol. 47:539
DUSKY AND DROPE
relied exclusively on the reports of the two psychiatrists who had
found Moran competent to stand trial in September of 1984.165 The
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, and Moran then filed his federal
habeas petition.1 66 After relief was denied in the district court, the
Ninth Circuit reversed:
Given the record in this case, the state court should have enter-
tained a good faith doubt about Moran's competency to make a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights.
Due process therefore required that the court hold a hearing to
evaluate and determine Moran's competency to waive constitu-
tional rights before it accepted his decision to discharge counsel
and change his pleas. This the state court failed to do.
1 6 7
In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit applied well-settled
procedural principles, developed in Drope v. Missouri 168 and Pate v.
Robinson,169 which obligate a trial court to conduct an adequate
inquiry whenever significant doubt is raised regarding a defendant's
competence. According to the Ninth Circuit, Moran's self-destruc-
tive behavior, his decisions to abandon his defense, his statement that
he was taking medication, and his monosyllabic responses to the col-
loquy questions raised sufficient doubt regarding his competence to
require the trial court to undertake a further inquiry.170 The determi-
nation that Moran was competent in September did not relieve the
court of its obligation to inquire in the November proceeding because,
as indicated by the Supreme Court in Drope, the trial court has a
continuing constitutional duty to monitor the defendant's
competence. 171
Under Drope, Moran is entitled to relief upon a showing that a
constitutionally adequate inquiry was not made at the time of his
guilty plea and waiver of counsel. He does not need to prove that he
was actually incompetent in November. 172 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's
application of Drope is not predicated upon a substantive ruling on
the legal test for competence to waive counsel and plead guilty.
Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis, the trial court's inquiry regarding
Moran's competence at the time of his guilty pleas was constitution-
ally inadequate even if the test for competence to plead guilty and
165. Id. at 267.
166. Id. at 264.
167. Id. at 265.
168. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
169. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
170. Moran, 972 F.2d at 265.
171. 420 U.S. at 181.
172. Id. at 180-82.
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otherwise waive constitutional rights is identical to the test for compe-
tence to stand trial.
Why, then, did the Ninth Circuit find it necessary to hold that
the standard for competence to plead guilty, and otherwise to waive
constitutional rights, is different from the standard for competence to
stand trial? The answer lies in the increasingly restrictive rules gov-
erning the prerogatives of federal courts in habeas proceedings. In the
course of its ruling dismissing all of Moran's constitutional claims, the
state habeas court stated that Moran had been "competent" at the
time of the plea proceeding in November of 1984. T7 The question
before the Ninth Circuit was whether this "finding" was entitled to a
"presumption of correctness" under the federal habeas statute. 174 If it
was, then the trial court's failure to conduct a constitutionally ade-
quate inquiry at the time of Moran's plea would have been harmless.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state habeas court's finding of
competence was not binding because the judge had applied an incor-
rect legal standard of competence:
The legal standard used to determine a defendant's competency to
stand trial is different from the standard used to determine compe-
tency to waive constitutional rights. A defendant is competent to
waive counsel or plead guilty only if he has the capacity for "rea-
soned choice" among the alternatives available to him. By con-
trast, a defendant is competent to stand trial if he merely has a
rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and is capa-
ble of assisting his counsel. Competency to waive constitutional
rights requires a higher level of mental functioning than that
required to stand trial. 
17
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded, the habeas court's finding that
Moran had been "competent" in November, 1984 was not entitled to
the presumption of correctness. The court went on to examine the
record and conclude that it could not "support a finding that Moran
was mentally capable of the reasoned choice required for a valid
waiver of constitutional rights" at the time of his guilty pleas. 76
Although the Ninth Circuit reached the correct result in Moran,
its analysis does not entirely comport with the approach recom-
mended in this Article. The court states that there are two compe-
173. 972 F.2d at 264.
174. Whether an appellate court should accord the presumption of correctness to state
court findings on mixed questions of law and fact relating to waivers of constitutional rights is
unclear. See, e.g., Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 879 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S.
Ct. 2963 (1992). The Moran court assumed that the presumption applied if the state court
used the correct legal standard. 972 F. 2d at 266 n.6.
175. 972 F.2d at 266 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 267 (footnote omitted).
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tence tests-one for "competence to stand trial" and one for
"competence to waive constitutional rights." The test for "compe-
tence to stand trial" includes "merely" rational and factual under-
standing of the proceedings and ability to assist counsel. (This
language, drawn from Dusky and Drope, is functionally equivalent to
"competence to assist counsel" as I have defined it here.) In contrast,
"competence to waive constitutional rights" requires capacity to
make a "reasoned choice" among alternatives-a higher standard.
I agree, of course, that "competence" of criminal defendants is
best viewed as two constructs, not one. However, I would redraw the
distinction so that the two applicable constructs are "competence to
assist counsel" (rather than "competence to stand trial") and "deci-
sional competence" (rather than "competence to waive constitutional
rights"). I doubt that the Ninth Circuit would quibble much about
this relabeling. My main disagreement with the court's analysis per-
tains to its assumption that the same test of decisional competence
("ability to make a reasoned choice") applies to all waivers of consti-
tutional rights or, more generally, to all decisions that the defendant
is required or expected to make in criminal defense. As I have noted
above, the criteria for decisional competence should not be the same
in all contexts, or even for all waivers of constitutional rights.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court need not resolve these questions
in order to decide the particular issue raised in Moran. On the facts
of this case, the Ninth Circuit's analysis is sound. First, even if
Moran was competent to assist counsel (in both September and
November), this finding does not suffice to establish that he was com-
petent to waive counsel and plead guilty in November. The latter
finding pertains to Moran's decisional competence, a distinct issue.
Second, in this context-when a capital defendant waives counsel and
enters a guilty plea without (or against) counsel's advice-the criteria
for decisional competence must be especially demanding. "Capacity
for reasoned choice among alternatives" provides a sensible formula-
tion of the competence standard in this context.
On the first point, the Supreme Court should explicitly endorse
the proposition that "competence" in criminal defense is not a unitary
construct. The Dusky/Drope test does not encompass the abilities
required for competent decisionmaking, and it would be unwise to
reformulate the Dusky/Drope test so that decisionmaking abilities
were encompassed within a single competence formula. Any criterion
of decisional competence used in the unitary test would be too
demanding in some contexts and not demanding enough in others.
Moreover, a unitary test would unnecessarily preclude adjudication in
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cases where surrogate decisionmaking provides a plausible response to
decisional incompetence.
Efficiency and finality provide the only possible advantages of a
unitary test. Yet even these advantages will not likely result because
sequential assessment and repeated judicial inquiries would be
required under even a unitary test. An analysis of the facts of Moran
illustrates the need for sequential assessment. At the time that the
doctors evaluated Moran, he and his lawyer had not yet had extensive
interactions, and it would have been premature and speculative for
these examiners to address Moran's possible competence to waive
counsel, to plead guilty, or to make any other decision that might be
anticipated. The initial evaluation, which was properly focused on
competence to assist counsel, could not have definitively resolved any
doubts that might-and in fact did-subsequently arise regarding
Moran's competence to make particular decisions regarding his
defense or the disposition of the case. This is why decisional compe-
tence must be sequentially evaluated, regardless of how the standard
is defined. In sum, little would be gained, and much would be lost, by
a ruling that "competence" is a single construct, encompassing abili-
ties required to make decisions and waive constitutional rights, as well
as the foundational abilities required to assist counsel.
Assuming that decisional competence and competence to assist
counsel are understood as separate constructs, the further question is
whether the criteria for competence to waive counsel and plead guilty
(without or against counsel's advice) should be as demanding as the
Ninth Circuit has required. If the Supreme Court addresses this ques-
tion at all, it need only decide that the "reasoned choice" formula
applies to the following situations: (1) waiver of counsel and a deci-
sion to represent oneself at trial under Faretta; (2) waiver of counsel
and a decision to enter a guilty plea without advice of counsel; and (3)
entry of a guilty plea against advice of counsel.' 77 In these situations,
the obligations of the trial court and counsel can be clearly stated.
Moreover, incompetence does not bar adjudication because default
rules are available: if the defendant is not competent to waive coun-
sel, counsel can be provided; if defendant's competence to make a
"reasoned choice" to plead guilty without or against counsel's advice
is doubted, the case can be tried.
17
1
177. Moran discharged counsel and entered his guilty plea. The same competence test
should apply if the defendant retains counsel, but enters the guilty plea against counsel's advice
because this situation would be functionally equivalent.
178. Although the issue is not before the Court, Moran also apparently refused to introduce
evidence in mitigation. I have argued that the test for decisional competence should also be
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One final point should be noted. It is not possible to say, based
on the existing record, whether Moran was able to make a "reasoned
choice among alternatives" in November of 1984. Even if the right
questions had been asked at that time, the court might have con-
cluded that he had good reasons for deciding not to contest his guilt
or seek leniency (he felt guilty and remorseful); that he was able,
notwithstanding his acute depressive symptoms, to understand the
possible consequences of these decisions and the arguments against
them (including the possibility of later regret); and that he was able to
weigh these considerations in a reasoned manner. Obviously, the
mere fact that Moran regretted his decision three years later does not
demonstrate that he lacked competence to make a reasoned choice in
November of 1984.
On the other hand, a clinical investigation of his mental and
emotional state conceivably could have raised a significant possibility
that his decision to capitulate was anchored in transient emotional
distress and unresolved conflict. Under these circumstances, perhaps
therapeutic intervention would have helped to resolve the problem
relatively quickly. Today, there is simply no way of knowing. This
further indicates why the decisional competence of a defendant who
insists on waiving counsel and pleading guilty-and in a death pen-
alty case, foregoing presentation of a case in mitigation-should be
fully explored in the trial court. If the issue is ignored in the trial
court, it is likely to receive-and should receive-critical attention in
federal habeas proceedings. Moran is typical in this respect as well.
VI. BEYOND DUSKY AND DROPE
The Supreme Court decided Dusky v. United States in 1960.
Although the Court has subsequently decided a number of cases
regarding the procedural aspects of competence assessment and adju-
dication,17 9 including such esoteric questions as who bears the burden
of persuasion when the evidence is in equipoise,10 it has not had the
occasion to elaborate further on the substantive aspects of the compe-
tence doctrine. As a result, many fundamental questions remain
unanswered. Courts seem especially confused about the relation
between the competence doctrine and legal rules relating to decision-
making by criminal defendants. No one seems sure whether and how
heightened in this situation. See Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, supra note 74, at
1388-89; see also State v. Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 576 (Ohio 1990).
179. E.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
180. See Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992).
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the components of the Dusky formula, as later embellished in Drope,
apply to impairments of abilities required for rational decisionmaking.
According to one view, Dusky does not provide the exclusive test
of competence in the criminal process. Instead, the test for compe-
tence to stand trial, as defined in Dusky, is supplemented by a sepa-
rate, "higher" test for guilty pleas and, perhaps, for waiving
constitutional rights. Such an approach has the advantage of permit-
ting adjudication in cases involving defendants who are able to satisfy
the Dusky criteria, but who may have impaired decisionmaking abili-
ties. However, an unqualified dual-competence approach poses
problems because it precludes modes of adjudication other than jury
trials (e.g. negotiated guilty pleas and bench trials) for some defend-
ants with mental disability. In addition, any doctrinal formulation
that increases the complexity of competence determinations and mul-
tiplies findings of incompetence tends to erode finality.
In response to these concerns, many courts have insisted that
Dusky states the sole test of competence in criminal adjudication. I8
But what does Dusky mean in relation to decisional competence?
Two answers can be discerned in the case law. On the one hand,
some courts seem to have focused exclusively on the factors expressly
mentioned in Dusky-the defendant's ability to "understand" the
proceedings and consult rationally with counsel.' 82 Under this view,
the court conclusively presumes that a defendant who has these abili-
ties also has the abilities required for rational decisionmaking. This
approach tends to promote efficiency of assessment and finality of
adjudication, but it can lead to morally dubious results when defend-
ants with obvious mental impairments insist on making what appear
to be self-defeating decisions, such as pleading guilty against counsel's
advice or discharging counsel altogether in capital cases. On the
other hand, some courts have held that the Dusky formula implicitly
incorporates decisionmaking abilities. 8 3 This approach legitimizes
181. For examples of courts that have applied the "single test," see, Allard v. Helgemoe,
572 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1978) and cases cited therein. However, the "multiple test" view
predominates when the issue is whether the Dusky test applies to insanity pleas. See, e.g.,
Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1979). By all account, the test for
competence to waive counsel and represent oneself is more demanding than the Dusky test.
See cases cited supra note 72.
182. See, e.g., Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Logan, 549 A.2d 531, 537 (Pa. 1988).
183. E.g., United States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 1990). For a discussion of the
broad view of the Dusky formula, see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 7-4.1
commentary at 168 (1986) and Ira Mickenberg, Competency to Stand Trial and the Mentally
Retarded Defendant: The Need for a Multi-Disciplinary Solution to a Multi-Disciplinary
Problem, 17 CAL. W. L. REV. 365, 385 (1981).
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paternalism when defendants have serious decisionmaking impair-
ments, but it has a major disadvantage-if taken seriously in practice,
it would preclude adjudication in many cases involving mentally dis-
abled defendants.I 4
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Lafferty v. Cook. 8 ' nicely
illustrates the continuing judicial uncertainty about the meaning of
Dusky in relation to decisional competence. Ronald Lafferty and his
brother were convicted of murdering their sister-in-law and her infant
daughter in 1984.186 Lafferty's brother pled guilty and received a life
sentence. 87 Lafferty was convicted at trial and was sentenced to
death. I'8 The homicides apparently were linked to what the trial
judge characterized as Lafferty's "unorthodox religious views"-
views that had previously led to his excommunication from the Mor-
mon Church.'89 During the days preceding the murders, Lafferty, his
brother and two companions "participated in prayer meetings at
which they discussed Ron Lafferty's religious revelations," one of
which directed him to "remove" the eventual victims.1 90
At arraignment, Ron Lafferty and his brother refused appoint-
ment of counsel, expressing the belief that all lawyers are corrupt, and
contended that because God had directed their actions, Utah had no
jurisdiction to try them.' 9' The trial court ordered a competence
assessment of Ron Lafferty. 192 Two psychiatrists found that even
though Lafferty fully understood the charges and proceedings in an
intellectual sense, his understanding of his situation was distorted by
"grandiosity" and by a "paranoid personality system or disorder."' 93
He seemed not to realize "how serious things were."' 94 Both examin-
ers concluded that he was incompetent.'95
At a two-day hearing in October, 1984, Lafferty and his brother
184. Because each of these approaches seems unsatisfactory, actual practice probably does
not conform to any of them. In practice, as commentators have routinely noted, the meaning
of incompetence is highly contextual; those who apply the law--examining clinicians and trial
judges-largely have discretion to define the term.
185. 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992).
186. Id. at 1548.
187. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Utah 1988).
188. 949 F.2d at 1549.
189. Id. at 1548.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1561. No question appears to have been raised about the competence of Dan
Lafferty, although the refusal of appointed counsel appears to have been a joint decision by
both brothers.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1562.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1561-62.
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insisted that their main reason for refusing appointed counsel was
"because we feel that we have our own best interests at heart," and
they objected to the doctors' characterization of Ron Lafferty's reli-
gious experience as a manifestation of mental disorder.196 The trial
judge "painstakingly explained how foolish it was for the brothers to
represent themselves" but he eventually ruled that Lafferty was com-
petent. 197 (The trial judge apparently deferred ruling on the self-rep-
resentation issue.) A month later, Lafferty was sent to the state
hospital for another competence examination after he attacked a
guard at the jail. 198 All four examiners concluded that he was compe-
tent and, based on the reports, the judge reaffirmed his earlier compe-
tence finding. 199
Matters changed drastically when Lafferty attempted to hang
himself in late December.2" At a hearing on January 28, 1985, Laf-
ferty was still experiencing difficulties with his memory resulting from
oxygen deprivation during the suicide attempt, and the judge ruled
that he was not yet competent to stand trial.201 Lafferty's final com-
petence hearing was held on April 2.202 Three examiners from the
state hospital testified that although Lafferty understood the proceed-
ings against him and their possible consequences, "he was unable as a
result of his paranoid delusional system to interpret them in a realistic
way. ' 20 3 Lafferty "believed that the examining doctors, the court sys-
tem and personnel, and his own lawyer were part of a corrupt man-
made order which he rejected and which he believed was actually on
trial. Because of these delusional beliefs, the doctors concluded that
Lafferty could not cooperate with a lawyer. ' '2 4 The prosecution
offered testimony by an expert who had examined the documents but
had not interviewed Lafferty. 205 He concluded that Lafferty's para-
noid delusional system was irrelevant to the issue of competency and
that his refusal to assist his attorney, while a product of delusion,
reflected a conscious choice.2 °6
The trial judge ruled that Lafferty was competent, finding that
even though Lafferty suffered from a mental illness, his condition was
196. Id. at 1562.
197. Id. (footnote omitted).
198. Id. at 1562.
199. Id. at 1563.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1564.
203. Id. at 1552.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1553.
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not severe enough to prevent him from comprehending the proceed-
ings or the punishment he faced.2 °7 The court also found that he was
able to assist his attorney "if he chooses to do so.' '2O8 With regard to
Lafferty's paranoia, the trial judge appears to have accepted the view
of the prosecution's expert:
Although the defendant may be operating within a paranoid delu-
sional system, there is no evidence, except a suicide attempt, of
irrational behavior within that system or within the system of his
religious beliefs. In fact, his refusal to cooperate, assist counsel or
admit that he is amenable to the laws of the State of Utah are all
consistent with his paranoia and any delusional system pertaining
to religion.2"9
After ruling that Lafferty was competent to stand trial, the court
conducted a telephone hearing with Lafferty and his counsel regard-
ing the possibility of an insanity plea.21 0 Lafferty's lawyer had filed a
notice of intent to present an insanity defense during the period when
Lafferty had been declared incompetent.21" ' Lafferty insisted that he
did not want to present such a defense because he did not believe that
he was insane. 2' 2 After he told the judge he would refuse to cooperate
with experts appointed to examine him, the court ruled that the
insanity defense could not be raised.213
At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the court considered Lafferty's
renewed request to represent himself together with Lafferty's coun-
sel's motions to withdraw. 214 The court denied these motions because
Lafferty refused to state on the record that he wished to represent
himself.215 However, the court informed Lafferty that he would have
every "reasonable opportunity to direct his counsel's strategy and
presentation of the case. "216
During the trial, defense counsel attempted to present testimony
by experts who had examined Lafferty during the competence pro-
ceedings in support of a claim of "diminished capacity" that, if
accepted, would reduce the offense to manslaughter. 2 7  However,
207. Id. at 1564.
208. Id. at 1565 (quoting Utah v. Lafferty, No. 9303, slip op. at 7 (D. Utah Apr. 8, 1985)).
209. Id. at 1554 (quoting Utah v. Lafferty, No. 9303, slip op. at 7).
210. Id. at 1549.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Under Utah law, refusal to cooperate with state-appointed examiners precludes the
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when counsel began to present this evidence, "Lafferty refused to let
him proceed, contrary to the attorney's forcefully expressed belief that
the presentation was absolutely imperative. '218 Left with no option,
his attorney rested.219 The trial court convicted Lafferty of capital
murder and subsequently sentenced him to death.22°
One can easily understand the predicament confronted by the
trial judge in this case. He clearly recognized that Lafferty was men-
tally ill, that his religious beliefs were intertwined with a paranoid
delusional disorder, and that his capacity for rational decisionmaking
was impaired.22' Yet, at the same time, the judge apparently believed
that Lafferty's disorder was not severe enough to preclude adjudica-
tion. Thus, at the time of the final competency hearing in April, the
court faced a stark choice-to allow the case to proceed despite Laf-
ferty's impairment or to find him incompetent, in which case he prob-
ably never would be brought to trial. The trial judge decided to allow
the case to go to trial and accordingly ruled, under the Dusky
formula, that Lafferty had a "rational understanding" of the proceed-
ings and was "able" to assist counsel if he chose to do so.
After the appellate court affirmed his convictions and sentences
on direct appeal, Lafferty filed a federal habeas petition that, after a
brief detour in the state courts, the federal district court denied. Laf-
ferty then appealed to the Tenth Circuit. In a 2-1 decision, a panel of
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and granted Lafferty's
petition. Like the trial judge, each member of the appellate panel rec-
ognized that the case required an interpretation of Dusky. According
to the majority:
This court cannot accept as consistent with Dusky and its progeny
a finding of competency made under the view that a defendant who
is unable to accurately perceive reality due to a paranoid delusional
system need only act consistently with his paranoid delusion to be
considered competent to stand trial.
The state court paid lip service to Dusky's requirement
that competency requires a rational understanding which is differ-
ent from, and more than, factual understanding. Nonetheless, in
view of the evidence that Lafferty's illness interfered with his accu-




221. The trial judge explicitly held that "Mr. Lafferty lacks the ability to engage in a
rational decisionmaking process regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated
by evidence of inability to weigh the costs and benefits of treatment." Id. at 1554 n.8.
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understanding was rational simply renders that requirement a
nullity....
Under the state court's view, then, a defendant suffering from
paranoid delusions is to be held competent to make decisions on
how best to present his mental state to a judge and jury even
though that mental illness may strip him of the ability to realisti-
cally determine where his best interests lie. Indeed, a defendant
operating in a paranoid delusional system may well believe that he
is not mentally ill and therefore, as did Lafferty, refuse to present
the defense at all. This result cannot be reconciled with the
requirements of due process.222
In doctrinal terms, the Tenth Circuit ruled, as a matter of law,
that the Dusky test encompasses decisionmaking abilities. Because
the trial judge had ignored Lafferty's impaired capacity for rational
decisionmaking, it had erred when it found Lafferty competent,
thereby enabling him "to make the crucial decision to waive an
insanity defense, contrary to the forceful advice of his frustrated attor-
ney, by refusing to cooperate in the mental examinations which are
state law prerequisites to assertion of the defense at trial.
'223
In dissent, Judge Brorby insisted that administration of Dusky's
formula should be left to the discretion of trial judges, and he chas-
tised the majority for "impermissibly substitut[ing], de novo, its find-
ings as to Mr. Lafferty's rational abilities for those of the trial
court. '224 In response to the majority's ruling that the trial judge had
ignored a legally relevant component of the Dusky test, Judge Brorby
argued that "rational understanding" is an open-textured concept
that "eludes any attempt at uniform definition. ' 225 This implies that
an impairment of rational decisionmaking capacity is not a separate
component of the Dusky test, as the majority appears to have ruled.22 6
Although Judge Brorby did not elaborate on the rationale for his
interpretation of Dusky, his reluctance to include capacity for rational
decisionmaking as a distinct element appears to be grounded in a dis-
taste for the paternalistic tendencies inhering in this approach:
The majority is unable to point to any evidence which shows
Mr. Lafferty was not accurately perceiving reality as it related to
222. Id. at 1554-56 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
223. Id. at 1555. Because the trial judge had not applied the correct legal standard, its
competence finding was not entitled to the "presumption of correctness" in federal habeas
proceedings.
224. Id. at 1558 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
226. It follows from Judge Brorby's analysis that the trial judge had applied the correct
legal test and that the federal courts on habeas review should have presumed his competence
finding to be correct.
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the murder charges and courtroom proceedings. Rather, it relies
solely upon the testimony at the last competency hearing and upon
Mr. Lafferty's refusal to present an insanity defense as evidence of
incompetence. From this fragment of the record, the majority con-
cludes Mr. Lafferty was a person suffering from mental illness to
such a degree that he was unable to make decisions on the basis of
a realistic evaluation of his own best interests. In reaching this
conclusion, the majority substitutes its judgment of what is "realis-
tic" and "best" for Mr. Lafferty. By taking issue with the subjec-
tive wisdom of Mr. Lafferty's decisions concerning how he wanted
his case handled, the majority in effect chills constitutionally pro-
tected individual decisionmaking.227
Neither of the views expressed in Lafferty is satisfactory. By
folding decisionmaking abilities into a unitary test of competence, the
majority's approach unwisely precludes adjudication in cases like Laf-
ferty's. But Judge Brorby's approach, which allows such cases to be
prosecuted, appears to foreclose any inquiry into the defendant's com-
petence to make decisions regarding the defense and disposition of the
case. The major thesis of this Article is that an alternative exists. The
key move, conceptually, is to unhinge decisional competence from the
Dusky formula.
Sensible resolution of Mr. Lafferty's case requires two separate
inquiries. The first question is whether Lafferty was competent to
assist counsel. To what extent did his delusional system, as it might
have been aggravated by the organic brain injury experienced during
the suicide attempt, impair his abilities to appreciate his situation as a
defendant in a criminal prosecution and to assist counsel in his own
defense? Standing alone, neither his belief that "all lawyers are cor-
rupt" nor his obstinacy and uncooperativeness are indicative of
incompetence. Obviously, a defendant's paranoid distrust of "all law-
yers" could preclude rational communication with an appointed
attorney, but Lafferty apparently did not harbor such a profound dis-
trust. He was able to communicate with, and provide necessary fac-
tual information to, his counsel, and the trial judge clearly felt that a
fair adjudication was possible, notwithstanding Lafferty's delusional
disorder. Based on the cold print in the appellate decisions, I see no
reason why adjudication should have been barred. Trying Lafferty
did not offend the moral dignity of the criminal process and any
doubts about the reliability of the adjudication were linked to Laf-
ferty's decisions about litigation strategy, not to any impairment of his
ability to communicate with counsel.
227. 949 F.2d at 1566 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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According to the trial court and Judge Brorby, this conclusion
fully disposes of the dispute; Lafferty's mental disorder has no legal
significance because he is competent under Dusky. But even if Laf-
ferty's disorder does not preclude adjudication, another question must
be addressed: Was Lafferty competent to make decisions in his own
best interests? Should his decisions be regarded as binding on his
attorney and on the trial judge? No reason appears why the resolu-
tion of this problem should be tied to the Dusky formula or to the bar
against adjudication that it entails. If Lafferty lacks decisional com-
petence, surrogate decisionmaking by the attorney provides a suitable
response. Lafferty's failure to cooperate with the examiners might
have barred an insanity plea, but his attorney could have been explic-
itly authorized to introduce clinical testimony in support of a dimin-
ished capacity defense, thereby providing the jury an alternative to a
capital murder conviction.
A finding of decisional incompetence and surrogate decisionmak-
ing by the attorney clearly would effectuate the paternalistic intuition
underlying the Tenth Circuit's decision in Lafferty. To say that this
option should be available, however, is not to say that it should be
routinely exercised, or even that it should have been exercised in Laf-
ferty's case. Whether a defendant fails to "appreciate" the nature and
consequences of the decision or lacks the capacity to make a "rea-
soned choice" is, of course, not a clinical "fact," but rather a thick
value judgment anchored in intuitions about individual autonomy and
social obligation. I suspect that all the judges in Lafferty v. Cook
knew that the case was about autonomy, but they did not know how
to frame the issue within the language of the Dusky formula. My
primary aim in this Article has been to show that sensible resolution
of cases such as Lafferty v. Cook requires a broadened conceptual
framework, one that supplements, but does not displace, Dusky and
Drope.
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